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Abstract 
  The first chapter of my dissertation uses the restricted access version of the Health 
and Retirement Survey (HRS) data to examine elderly workers responses to changes in 
housing wealth, property taxes and financial wealth. The findings suggest older workers 
respond to variation in housing wealth and property taxes in the predicted opposing 
directions, that wealth influences labor supply to a lesser extent than factors like health 
and marital status, and that the effect of housing wealth on labor supply varies 
significantly by gender and age. Collectively, this set of findings answers several 
questions, but additionally motivates my second essay. 
        In my second chapter, the effects of housing wealth and property taxes on older 
households are further explored, focusing on the timing of retirement and unretirement 
decisions. Early retirement expectations are also considered and I identify factors 
associated with cases where gaps exist between expectations and later retirement 
realizations.  I again use the restricted access HRS data to carry out this investigation.  
The findings complement my first essay by verifying that both retirement and 
unretirement transitions are affected by housing wealth, property taxes and financial 
wealth in expected directions. However, only financial wealth serves as major 
mechanisms through which expectations influence retirement behaviors. Unexpected 
changes in retirement decisions seem to be directly influenced by housing wealth 
shocks.  
        Chapter 3 focuses on the market for reverse mortgages. Reverse mortgages have 
played an increasingly important role as one of the major options available to elderly 
homeowners who wish to use their current home equity to finance consumption during 
their retirement. This places it on par with other important housing related decisions, 
such as downsizing, migrating to low cost regions, direct withdrawals of home equity, 
and exiting homeownership in favor of renting or even moving into an assisted living 
arrangement. My analysis relies primarily on loan level Home Equity Conversion 
Mortgage (HECM) data from the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) and housing price index data from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). 
The paper aims to investigate factors influencing the demand for reverse mortgages, 
x 
emphasizing the role of changes in housing prices.  The primary contribution of the 
paper comes from exploring the potentially asymmetric effect of changing housing 
prices on reverse mortgage originations.  Intuitively, both the current price level and the 
expected future price level should influence this decision making process.  While the 
results should be viewed as preliminary, I find evidence to support this claim.  Finally, 
the essay examines whether or not these effects vary across different types of family 
arrangements (e.g., single, married, with and without children). 
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Chapter 1: Housing Wealth, Property Taxes and Labor Supply among 
the Elderly 
1.1 Introduction 
        Over recent decades, striking changes in the demographic composition of the U.S. 
labor force and the nature of elderly labor supply have taken place concurrently. 
Unprecedented growth in the number of elderly headed households complemented the 
only upswing in elderly labor force participation rates seen in modern history. In 2012, 
more than one out of every five workers in the U.S. was age 55 or older, compared with 
just one out of every eight as recently as 2000. While demographic factors clearly play 
the largest role in explaining this shift, the past two decades have also witnessed a 
reversal in the persistent trend toward earlier retirement that dominated the post WWII 
environment (Haider and Loughran, 2001). Figure 1.1 shows Current Population Survey 
(CPS) estimated labor force participation rates for various age groups over the period 
1948-2010. [Figure 1.1 about here] For workers age 55 and up, there was a strong 
decline over the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. However, this trend abruptly reversed course 
in the early 1990s, reaching a point where over 60 percent of Americans between age 55 
and 64 are employed. Also, Figure 1.2 shows the ratio of part-time to full-time 
employment among workers aged 65 and up has actually been declining since the 
mid1990s, due to a persisting increase in rates of full-time employment. [Figure 1.2 
about here] These striking changes motivate careful investigation of the factors 
influencing the labor decisions of older workers. 
        Over the same period, the value of residential homes varied dramatically, with a 
particularly strong boom/bust cycle characterizing the last fifteen years. Given the fact 
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that housing wealth is the primary component of retirement asset portfolios for so many 
aging U.S. households (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007), fluctuations in the housing sector 
make older households particularly exposed to unexpected wealth shocks. Hence, the 
relative scarcity of research examining potential linkages between the two is surprising. 
While several studies examine the relationship between housing wealth and levels of 
current consumption and savings (Bhatia, 1987; Engelhardt, 1996; Benjamin, Chinloy 
and Jud, 2004; Case, Quigley and Schiller, 2005), very few papers systematically relate 
housing wealth to elderly labor supply, especially current labor supply. Additionally, 
property taxes, as a factor directly linked to home values and applicable to every 
homeowner, may affect elderly labor decisions through current liquidity constraints. 
Very few studies consider the role of property tax burdens in making labor decisions 
among older households.  
      This study uses the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to investigate the role of 
two key housing related variables – housing wealth and property taxes – in determining 
elderly labor supply. We adopt two alternative measures of housing wealth; self-
reported values and MSA level housing price indexes. Since each carries certain 
advantages and disadvantages over the other, the two sources of variation are explored 
using different models. First, we take advantage of plausibly exogenous variation in 
housing wealth using a within-MSA renter vs. homeowner difference-in-difference 
approach. Second, we examine within-household longitudinal variation in self-reported 
housing wealth using multiple estimation strategies that mitigate endogeneity concerns. 
We reach five main findings. First, changes in housing wealth influence elderly labor 
supply at similar levels of intensity to changes in financial assets and, unsurprisingly, 
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work in the same direction. Second, changes in housing wealth influence female labor 
supply to a greater extent than male labor supply when considering the extensive 
margin of labor force participation. Third, changes in property tax liabilities offset a 
portion of the effect associated with gains/losses in housing wealth. Fourth, changes in 
housing wealth exert stronger effects on workers in their middle-to-late 50s and their 
middle-to-late 60s than they do on workers in their early 50s and early 60s. Finally, 
using changes in MSA-specific housing price indexes as a proxy for housing wealth 
shocks, we find the negative influence of housing wealth on elderly labor supply 
surfaces through a within-MSA renter versus homeowner difference-in-difference 
specification. 
1.2 Background and Theory 
1.2.1 Determinants of Elderly Labor Supply 
        Within the considerable literature examining labor supply among older workers, 
there is consensus that certain factors influence elderly labor force participation and 
retirement decisions. One of the most commonly studied factors is financial wealth (e.g., 
Coronado and Perozek 2003; French 2005; Coile and Levine 2006 & 2011a; Kostol and 
Mogstad 2013). Life-cycle theory predicts unexpected gains in wealth should boost the 
consumption of goods and services as well as leisure. Some papers try to understand 
this relationship through focusing on the effects of inheritances and lottery winnings 
that are naturally framed as unexpected wealth shocks. Evidence suggests that the 
recipients of unanticipated financial wealth are more likely to reduce labor supply (see, 
e.g., Joulfaian and Wilhelm 1994). To examine the effect of financial wealth on labor 
decisions among the elderly, other plausible unexpected shocks in wealth have been 
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used. For example, Coronado and Perozek (2003) find that older individuals that held 
corporate equity immediately prior to the bull market of the 1990s retired, on average, 7 
months earlier than otherwise similar individuals who did not.  
        Three other benefit-related factors widely acknowledged to influence elderly labor 
are Social Security eligibility and/or Social Security wealth (Burtless and Moffitt 1985; 
Krueger and Pischke 1992; Gruber and Kubik 1997; Coile and Gruber 2000 & 2007; 
Coile and Levine 2011b; Gruber and Orszag 2003; Liebman, Luttmer and Seif 2009; 
Vere 2011), pension and medicare (Ruhm 1996; French 2005; French and Jones 2011; 
Kaushal 2014), and Disability Insurance benefits (Kostol and Mogstad 2013). Besides 
the life-cycle framework, forward-looking models and option value models have also 
established the effects of policy-related benefits; generally finding these factors help 
explain current labor supply and retirement decisions. Additionally, some conditions 
within the macro-economic environment, such as labor market tightness and the 
performance of the stock market, have consistently been shown to impact people‟s 
retirement behaviors (e.g., Coile and Levine 2006, 2007 and 2011a; Disney, Ratcliffe, 
and Smith 2010; Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai 2010; Goda, Shoven and Slavov 
2011 & 2012). Coile and Levine (2011a) show that workers age 62 to 69 are responsive 
to local unemployment rates and long-term fluctuations in stock market returns, and that 
the impact of the unemployment rate is nearly 50 percent larger than the effect of the 
stock market crash. Not surprisingly, changes in health have also been widely verified 
as a threat that may force older workers to exit the labor force (e.g., Hanoch and Honig 
1983; Coile and Levine 2007; Hurd and Rohwedder 2008). 
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        While studies considering the effect of retirement assets on elderly labor supply are 
well developed on several margins, there are two significant aspects that have received 
little attention to date. First, most studies focus exclusively on the timing of retirement 
decisions, whereas few papers have investigated the effect of wealth on the intensive 
margin. More importantly, although it serves as the dominant component of retirement 
asset portfolios for most elderly households, housing equity has been given very little 
attention. In fact, since households endogenously choose housing consumption and 
make decisions regarding mortgage indebtedness, very little can be said about how 
elderly labor supply responds to changes in housing wealth without careful empirical 
work designed to identify exogenous variation. 
1.2.2 The Role of Housing Wealth 
        Housing wealth has recently attracted attention from a literature focusing on the 
link between consumption and housing wealth (e.g., Bhatia 1987; Benjamin et al., 2004; 
Lettau and Ludvigson 2004; Case et al., 2005; Campbell and Cocoo 2007; Kishor 2007; 
Bostic et al., 2009) Consistent with family labor supply models and life-cycle theory 
(Ashenfelter and Heckman 1974), the consensus is that unexpected gains (losses) in 
housing wealth lead to increases (decreases) in current consumption. Since leisure time 
has frequently been cited as an important component of the consumption portfolio of 
elderly households, our study adds to this emerging literature.  
        Most existing work examining the influence of housing wealth on elderly labor 
supply focuses on the timing of retirement (Sevak 2002; Farnham and Sevak 2007; 
Disney, Ratcliffe, and Smith 2010; Zhao 2011), generally finding evidence to support 
the idea that such wealth effects are present. These studies rely on the assumption that 
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the leisure is a normal good and that, like other categories of wealth, housing wealth 
impacts the elasticity of retirement. Farnham and Sevak (2007) find that a 10% increase 
in housing wealth is associated with a reduction in expected retirement age of 3.5 to 5 
months. Zhao (2011) reveals quantitatively large impacts of housing wealth, and 
identifies the importance of three working channels including a resizing effect, a 
bequest motive, and collateral borrowing. Conversely, Disney, Ratcliffe, and Smith 
(2010) analyze British survey data and find little evidence of these effects. Our study 
adds to the literature by considering the influence of housing wealth on both the 
extensive (participation) and intensive (work status and hours worked) margins of 
elderly labor supply. We do so in a manner that accounts for wealth held in financial 
assets and other factors influencing elderly labor supply. 
        A broadening of scope to incorporate housing wealth is past due. We show that 
around 80 percent of households age 50 and over are homeowners and that for the 
majority of these households, housing wealth accounts for over half of aggregate wealth. 
This concentration of housing wealth combines with limited sources of liquid assets and 
current income to make elderly households particularly vulnerable to unexpected 
housing wealth shocks. As predicted within the life-cycle framework, households 
consumption-smooth by saving during working years to boost future consumption 
during retirement and/or periods of reduced labor supply. Studies in this area 
consistently find accumulated pre-retirement wealth influences the level of expected 
spending households believe they will have in retirement (e.g., Bernheim, Skinner, and 
Weinberg 2001; Hurd and Rohwedder 2003). 
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        Even given the expected influence of housing wealth on labor outcomes, it is not 
hard to understand the relative dearth of research on the topic. The biggest challenge to 
identifying the effect of housing wealth on labor supply has been overcoming a 
potential endogeneity problem. Housing wealth is typically defined as the value of 
owned property less the financial obligations tied to the property (i.e., mortgage debt). 
Note that households make dynamic utility maximizing decisions regarding both 
components. Choices like moving into a significantly higher/lower cost area or 
upsizing/downsizing house size are the most obvious of these intertwined decisions. 
Additionally though, control over housing wealth becomes even more nuanced once 
behaviors like home upkeep/renovation, pre-paying down mortgage principle, and 
taking out home-equity loans are accounted for. Our study follows a strategy that has 
been used to recent success in addressing other questions related to housing wealth, 
framing geographic variation in the previous boom/bust cycle in home prices as 
generating variation in housing wealth that is plausibly exogenous at the household 
decision making level – particularly when focusing on otherwise similar renters vs. 
homeowners in areas experiencing the same housing market conditions. 
        Figure 1.3.1 summarizes the 120-year historical trend of home values in the U.S., 
aggregated annually, based on the Case-Schiller repeat-sales housing price index. 
[Insert Figure 1.3.1 about here] Other than minor fluctuations in the late 1970s and late 
1980s, national aggregate home price indexes moved in relatively stable patterns, 
showing very little change in real terms between the early 1950s and mid 1990s. 
However, since the late 1990s, the U.S. experienced a gradual but significant boom in 
the housing market until the crisis of 2007. Between 1996 and 2006, U.S. nominal home 
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values nearly doubled, and then abruptly fell to the previous late 1990s level by the end 
of 2011, meaning the gains accumulated from the housing boom were completely 
destroyed. Figure 1.3.2 shows the national housing price index and national 
appreciation rate of home equity since 1991, based on Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA) data. [Insert Figure 1.3.2 about here] These periods of housing boom and 
subsequent collapse provide sufficient exogenous variation for examining the effects of 
housing wealth. Figure 1.3.3 presents the recent 20-year Home Equity Conversion 
Mortgage (HECM) loans and its average property values from 1990 to 2010. [Insert 
Figure 1.3.3 about here] Both counts as well as the value/magnitude of HECM loans 
share a similar pattern with the recent housing boom/bust cycle (although there appears 
to be a minor lag associated with movement in HECM loans). This verifies the idea that 
housing wealth serves as a precautionary buffer that can be cashed out in the event of a 
financial or health related downturn (Skinner, 1996).  
1.2.3 Comparison of Wealth Effects 
        Several studies have compared the potential differences between the effects of 
housing wealth and financial market wealth, reaching a degree of consensus that 
housing wealth shocks have a greater effect on current consumption than financial 
wealth (e.g., Benjamin et al., 2004; Lettau and Ludvigson 2004; Case et al., 2005; 
Campbell and Cocoo 2007; Kishor 2007). The main reason typically provided along 
with this finding is that unanticipated wealth shocks must be perceived as permanent in 
order to affect current consumption. The perception is that households are more likely 
to expect transitory shocks to dominate changes in financial wealth, whereas permanent 
shocks are likely expected to account for most of the variation in housing wealth. In this 
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study, we aim to develop an understanding of wealth effects on elderly leisure 
consumption, as reflected in current labor supply. It is possible that housing wealth 
shocks may also have a greater effect on elderly labor supply than similarly sized 
changes in financial wealth. 
1.2.4 The Role of Property Taxes 
        Property taxes should also influence elderly labor supply. As housing equity 
increases (decreases) due to unexpected positive (negative) shocks to home values, the 
property tax payment the homeowner must cover rises (falls).
1
 Shan (2010) found that 
increasing property taxes during the recent housing boom tightened liquidity constraints 
among elderly households and influenced elderly mobility behaviors. As mentioned 
earlier, many elderly households concentrate their assets in the housing sector, and do 
not have high incomes or other liquid assets. During the housing boom, this 
countervailing effect should incentivize an increase in labor supply. Remaining in the 
labor force longer and/or working more intensively mitigates the financial pressure of 
higher property taxes, potentially working to offset at least a portion of the housing 
wealth effect. Without controlling for property tax liabilities, the estimated effect of 
housing wealth would be biased toward zero, since the coefficient then reflects the total 
net effect (i.e., combines the expected negative effect of housing wealth and the 
expected positive effect of property tax liabilities). To our knowledge, Shan (2008) is 
the only study that considers the effects of property taxes on elderly labor supply. 
However, she did not find significant effects and did not separately test for the effects of 
                                                          
1
 Homeowner‟s holding the majority stake in their property see these increases directly through higher 
property tax bills they pay, whereas homeowner‟s still in mortgages where the lender is collecting 
property taxes over the course of the year experience higher mortgage payments.  
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changes in housing wealth. Hence, there is a need for more empirical research that 
simultaneously accounts for the role of both countervailing factors. In our analysis, both 
difference-in-difference and longitudinal approaches are used. Each of these 
methodologies is discussed in greater detail in Section IV. 
1.2.5 Contributions and Extensions 
        While our study is not the first to consider the effect of housing wealth on elderly 
labor supply, we extend this relatively thin literature in three specific ways. First, the 
papers in this area generally focus on how housing wealth affects the timing of 
retirement decisions rather than current labor supply decisions, generally finding that 
greater housing wealth leads to earlier retirement (Sevak, P. 2002; Coronado and 
Perozek 2003; Farnham and Sevak 2007; Disney, Ratcliffe and Smith 2010; Ondrich 
2010). Second, previous studies were limited by data availability, such that they were 
not able to examine the role of the recent great recession and gain from the plausibly 
exogenous variation it created. Our data environment shows periods of prolonged gains 
in housing wealth but also covers several years where large losses in housing wealth 
were common. Finally, no previous study has included both housing wealth and 
property tax liabilities in regressions exploring elderly labor outcomes. This is troubling 
since the two are, by construction, directly linked to one another, and are expected to 
operate in offsetting directions. 
        In addition, since the boom/bust cycle created dramatically different price 
movements across U.S. geographies, our extensions involve matching MSA specific 
housing price indexes from FHFA to each elderly household surveyed by HRS. For 
example, elderly homeowners in Texas experienced dramatically different housing 
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wealth transitions than otherwise similar households living in Florida, during a time 
period where their financial portfolios likely behaved similarly. Adding this perspective 
to the existing HRS self-reported housing price estimates further identifies these 
plausibly exogenous wealth shocks, and allows even more precise identification (dif-in-
dif) based on a comparison of renters and homeowners living in the same cities. 
Housing price indexes also overcome the drawback of potential measurement error in 
self-reported home values, and using both measures positions our study to become the 
first to directly test whether or not these two commonly used measures of house price 
lead to the same answer to our questions of interest. 
        The remaining portions of this paper are organized as follows. Section III describes 
our data. Section IV outlines our empirical methodology. Section V presents our 
estimation results. Section VI concludes and discusses future directions. 
1.3 Data 
        The primary data used in this study come from the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS), sponsored by the National Institute on Aging. The HRS is a nationally 
representative biannual longitudinal data set, surveying individuals over age 50 and 
their spouses. It provides comprehensive information regarding socio-economic and 
demographic variables, health status, financial and housing wealth, income, benefits, 
social security, pensions, and employment history. The data we use are the ten waves 
from 1991 through 2010. They contain five cohorts including the original HRS cohort 
(OHRS), the Assets and Health Dynamics cohort (AHEAD), the Children of Depression 
cohort (CD), the War Baby cohort (WB), and the Early Baby Boomer cohort (EBB). 
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Figure 1.4 shows around forty percent of our data come from the OHRS cohort, while 
the AHEAD cohort represents another fifth. [Figure 1.4 about here] 
        Table 1.1 provides the specific timing of the survey for each cohort. [Insert Table 
1.1 about here] The OHRS cohort, born 1931 to 1941, was first interviewed in 1992 and 
subsequently every two years thereafter. The AHEAD cohort, born in 1924 or earlier, 
was first interviewed in 1993. With the exception of a three year gap between 1995 and 
1998, they also follow the bi-annual survey pattern. The CD and WB cohorts were 
added to the HRS survey in 1998, and consist of individuals born between 1924 and 
1930, and 1942 and 1947, respectively. The EBB cohort, born between 1948 and 1953, 
was first interviewed in 2004, and subsequently every two years. Since each cohort 
entered the survey at a different time, it is highly unlikely our eventual results could be 
driven by the characteristics or economic experiences of a particular cohort. However, 
we still explored robustness checks that included various cohort groupings, finding all 
our main results are retained. 
        The HRS compiles responses to detailed questions of employment history that are 
consistent across waves. This allows us to construct dependent variables measuring 
elderly labor supply reflecting both the extensive margin and intensive margin. These 
include labor force participation, full-time or part-time working status, and hours 
worked per year. Figure 1.5 illustrates the working status shares of respondents by age, 
including working full-time, working part-time and not working. [Insert Figure 1.5 
about here] As expected given the structure of the Social Security program, the share of 
elderly persons working full-time declines monotonically with age and declines 
dramatically during the early to mid 60s. Whereas over half the sample works full-time 
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prior to reaching age 60, by 69 fewer than 1 in 10 is still doing so. The peak of part-time 
employment proportion is 18.65% at the age group of 65 to 67 years old, which 
suggests part-time employment serves as an alternative form of labor supply post 
retirement, or for workers preparing to retire soon. 
        The key variables of interest in our study relate to housing wealth. HRS asks 
questions about home ownership, self-assessed home value, mortgage payment, and the 
nature of loans on households‟ first and second mortgages. While it is common to use 
home value as a proxy for housing wealth, home value only reflects the amount of 
housing services consumed, not the amount of accumulated housing wealth. For most 
households there is a prolonged period following purchase where extensive liabilities 
are owed to banks, meaning how heavily the household is in debt determines their 
housing wealth. In our analysis, the net value of home equity is used to reflect housing 
wealth. Figure 1.6.1 displays the asset allocations of elderly households that we analyze 
in this study over the period 1991 through 2010. [Insert Figure 1.6.1 about here] 
Unsurprisingly, home values and housing wealth share a strikingly similar trend over 
time, with a prolonged boom since the late 1990s, and a following bust beginning in 
2007. However, there is an increasing gap around the bust period, which is consistent 
with the observed mortgage foreclosure crisis. Additionally, given the heterogeneity in 
households‟ experiences driven by different mortgage lengths and decisions over 
second and third mortgages, these averages mask considerable variation that surfaces 
across different household experiences. Financial wealth and property taxes are also 
illustrated in the same chart, and they appear to be on a trend consistent with the 
housing market fluctuation. We observe that financial wealth falls below the level of 
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housing wealth around 2000, which once again emphasizes the increasing importance of 
housing wealth among retirement portfolios for elderly American households. 
        Since the housing measures in the HRS are self-reported, a potentially valid 
criticism of using this measure is that respondents report perceived price variations, as 
opposed to actual market values. Figure 1.6.2 compares real growth rates of self-
reported home value and housing wealth with the national real appreciation of home 
equity derived from MSA specific home price index, each deflated by the national 
consumer price index. [Insert Figure 1.6.2 about here] While the measures clearly show 
co-movement, more volatility is seen in the self-reported values. The figure illustrates 
overly optimistic prospects on home values during the boom and slightly pessimistic 
Fgiexpectations during the housing market collapse. Perceptions over fluctuations in 
housing wealth may more directly influence homeowners‟ decision, which provides one 
argument for using self-reported value as the housing wealth measure. However, our 
extension of merging MSA-specific home value index with our household data will 
allow our study to be the first to examine the effect of perceptions versus reality when it 
comes to elderly homeowners‟ labor decisions. We match MSA level house price 
indexes from the FHFA, along with MSA level unemployment rates from the BLS, and 
state level tax burden rate from the Tax Foundation, with household survey data through 
state-county identifiers provided by restricted HRS data.
2
 
        Table 1.2 presents labor force participation rates, by age and by housing wealth 
percentile. [Insert Table 1.2 about here] We see decreasing participation rates with age 
for all respondents, regardless of their position within the housing wealth distribution. 
                                                          
2
 House price indexes and unemployment rates are measured at state level, and local tax burden rates 
are computed at state level. 
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The three most dramatic transitions are the age groups of 59-61, 62-64 and 64-67, 
consistent with previous evidence from the literature on retirement timing. Through a 
simple comparison of households whose housing wealth lies in different percentile 
groups, a positive correlation between labor participation and housing wealth is 
observed. In the upper percentiles, the labor participation rate is significantly higher for 
all age groups. However, this pattern is not sufficient to claim a causal link between 
elderly labor and housing wealth, as other critical information is being ignored. First, 
there are several characteristics of respondents with more housing wealth accumulated 
that also influence, labor supply positively, such as better health or differences in skills 
and employment opportunities. Also, certain factors closely related to housing wealth 
(e.g., property tax liabilities) may have the opposite impact on elderly labor supply. As 
such, estimating the causal effect of housing wealth and property taxes on elderly labor 
supply requires further empirical examination. 
        Table 1.3 lists all our variables, along with their descriptions and data sources. 
[Insert Table 1.3 about here] Table 1.4 displays summary statistics for the 127,336 
observations used in our analysis, along with subsample statistics for homeowners and 
renters. [Insert Table 1.4 about here] As is common in cases where data are self-
reported, a few intuitive filters are created. First, while the HRS survey targets only 
individuals older than 50, spouses (who can fill out the survey) can be much younger. 
Since this study aims to examine the effect of housing wealth and property taxes on 
labor supply among a particular group (i.e., elderly households), observations from 
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respondents younger than 44 are dropped. This thins the sample by less than one 
percent
3
. 
Additionally, procedures are used to clean the data based on housing wealth, 
financial wealth and property taxes. Respondents with housing debt that greatly exceeds 
the value of their home have the option of foreclosure, while households with 
considerable negative financial wealth may have high risks of going through bankruptcy. 
In both cases, it is a stretch to assume large negative wealth values should enter later 
estimations. Also, extremely rich and extremely poor respondents may exhibit 
systematically different behaviors in the labor market, and we acknowledge that our 
estimated models may fail to capture this. Dropped observations due to wealth that is 
exceedingly high (over $1,000,000) or negative and large in absolute values also 
represent less than one percent of the original data. Household level financial assets are 
calculated as the dollar amount of wealth held in stocks, mutual funds, investment trusts, 
checking, savings, money market accounts, government saving bonds and other bonds. 
We drop observations that fail to report any of these financial assets, as pervasive zeros 
could represent two very different types of cases: reporting omissions (i.e., the true 
values are non-zero, but the respondent is skipping these questions) or non-banking 
households (perhaps driven by a lack of access) where all financial assets are truly zero. 
Fourth, since property taxes are a critical variable in our study, we ensure the self-
reported property taxes are not unrealistically high. As such, observations with 
estimated property tax rates over ten percent of house values are excluded from the 
                                                          
3
 Since the sample covers households with a wide range of ages reported by the respondent, we restrict 
our analysis within various age groups separately, as well as the entire sample. Heterogeneous effects 
across age groups are discussed in Section 5.4.  
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analysis.
4
 After applying all the filters, the data contains 127,336 distinct observations, 
103,593 coming from homeowners and 23,743 from renters. Summary statistics for the 
first differenced variables are also reported.  
1.4 Empirical Methodology 
        As outlined in Section II, elderly households are expected to respond to 
unexpected increases in wealth by supplying less labor, while responding to unexpected 
increases in financial liabilities by supplying more. Gains in wealth, in the form of both 
financial assets and housing equity, should raise the consumption of leisure and be 
associated with higher likelihoods of working part-time or exiting the labor force. At the 
same time, current liabilities stemming from holding those assets (e.g. property taxes), 
should have the opposite effect. This creates an interesting trade-off, as increased 
(decreased) housing wealth and increased (decreased) property tax liabilities are both 
associated with unexpected positive (negative) shocks to housing prices. We use the 
HRS and our supplemental data to estimate several empirical models that disentangle 
the dual nature of these effects, while controlling for other factors that have been shown 
to influence elderly labor supply.  
1.4.1 Alternative Measures of Housing Wealth 
        We use two measures of housing wealth – self-reported values and MSA house 
price indexes – each carrying certain advantages and disadvantages over the other. 
MSA specific house price indexes (HPIs) represent a commonly used instrument that 
captures quasi-experimental variation in housing wealth, exogenous to households‟ 
individual shocks. This technique has been used to great success in the context of the 
                                                          
4
 According to data from taxfoundation.org, no U.S. state had an average effective property tax rate 
exceeding 2% during our sample. 
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recent boom/bust cycle in the housing market. However, we acknowledge two well 
known limitations of these measures. First, although HPIs document wide variation in 
price movements across metropolitan areas, they do not reflect important heterogeneity 
at the local neighborhood level. Ferreira and Gyourko (2012) provide several stylized 
facts related to heterogeneity in the length and amplitude of the housing boom and how 
they interact with neighborhood level pricing dynamics, even finding that several socio-
economic characteristics are correlated to this meaningful heterogeneity. Second, HPIs 
only reflect the overall movement of home values at the MSA level, and are thus 
completely unrelated to the portion of heterogeneity in housing wealth driven by 
changes the mortgage liabilities that better represent the actual mechanism through 
which wealth in housing sector is accumulated. 
        Conversely, self-reported housing wealth carries its own advantages/disadvantages. 
The clearest advantage is that rich variation can be seen in the HRS household level 
housing wealth measures. This is likely being driven by the exact factors being missed 
by the HPIs that we mentioned above. For example, the HRS data accounts for unpaid 
mortgage debt. Additionally, self-reported housing wealth captures heterogeneity on 
many dimensions including very local/neighborhood level price variation. However, 
there are two concerns regarding its usage. First, a common critique of self-reported 
data is that measurement error may be present. That is, if households are not fully aware 
of their home value or mortgage liabilities, they may inaccurately report it on the HRS 
survey. Fortunately, previous work suggests that homeowner‟s report their house values 
and mortgages reasonably accurately (Bucks and Pence 2006), so we expect this issue 
to be minor. Moreover, note that response errors in this case are not necessarily noise. 
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The reason is that any systematic differences between household expectations and true 
market values may serve as a meaningful signal. In theory, housing wealth should 
impact behavior through perceived housing wealth shocks, such that beliefs regarding 
home equity may in fact be the appropriate measure. The second concern regarding 
these data relates to the advantage of the HPI indexes; that is, the nature of the variation 
found in self-reported housing wealth may be endogenous to labor outcomes. 
Specifically, households may initially decide among their housing options having 
already formed plans that involve supplying specific amount of labor in the future. 
Fortunately, the longitudinal nature the HRS data provides a mechanism for mitigating 
potential reverse causality bias associated with this threat. Since each measure holds 
certain advantages over the other, we use both in our analyses, finding qualitatively 
similar effects of housing wealth on labor supply in both cases. 
1.4.2 Difference-in-Difference Estimations 
        In this section, we describe a difference-in-difference approach designed to 
identify the effect of housing wealth by comparing changes in the behavior of otherwise 
similar homeowners and renters during time periods containing exogenous fluctuations 
in housing value. We identify a treatment group (homeowners) that experienced quasi-
experimental housing wealth shocks and a control group (renters) that did not. This 
identification strategy relies on our MSA level HPIs. 
        During the recent housing boom/bust cycle, homeowners experienced unexpected 
positive and negative shocks in housing wealth, whereas renters did not. While the self 
reported HRS measures do not reflect the housing market conditions for renters (i.e., 
renters in the survey do not estimate the value of comparable homes/condos or the value 
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of the rental unit in which they reside) our MSA level HPIs do. As such, it is 
appropriate to use the aggregated measure to estimate the heterogeneous effect of time-
specific or regional housing market conditions on labor decision between our control 
and treatment groups. For example, if housing wealth affects labor decisions, we would 
expect to see different patterns of labor supply between homeowners and renters over 
the boom/bust cycle. This strategy adopts what we believe is a reasonable assumption: 
with meaningful characteristics of households otherwise controlled for, 
homeowner/renter status is then exogenous in the sense that homeownership is not 
correlated to other characteristics that affect labor supply.  
        Specifically, we estimate the difference-in-difference between homeowners and 
renters during the housing boom/bust period as: (         
                    
       )  
(         
                    
       ). As seen in Figure 6b, self-reported housing wealth and 
our regional HPIs both track a pronounced housing boom from 1997 to 2006, followed 
by a bust from 2007 to 2010. Our dif-in-dif models of labor supply are estimated using 
a pooled cross section of respondents from the control and treatment group between 
1997 and 2010.  
                                                                  
                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                    
where labor outcome contains three outcomes: 1) a dummy variable for labor force 
participation, 2) a categorical variable for working status indicating full-time, part-time 
or no work, and 3) a continuous variable reflecting naturally logged annual working 
hours. Bust equals 1 if the respondent was surveyed between 2007 and 2010, and 0 if 
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surveyed between 1997 and 2006. The coefficient    captures the effect of the housing 
cycle that was common to renters and homeowners. Homeowner is a dummy variable 
for homeownership. Its coefficient (  ) captures time-invariant differences between 
renters and homeowners. Bust*homeowner is the interaction term accounting for 
homeowner status during the bust period, making    our coefficient of interest, as it 
measures the effect of housing wealth on labor supply. The remaining right hand side 
variables include property taxes, financial assets, a health status indicator, the local 
unemployment rate and local tax burden, demographic characteristics including gender, 
age, race, education, and marital status, and wave specific dummies. 
        An alternative approach to measuring the effect of housing wealth through a 
difference-in-difference model is to identify the heterogeneity in labor supply between 
homeowners and renters according to more precisely measured movements in housing 
values across regions and over time. In this approach, our MSA specific HPIs are used 
to proxy for changes in housing wealth experienced by homeowners. Hence, an 
interaction term between the growth rate of the applicable HPI and homeowner status 
becomes the variable of interest. Since changes in home prices are capitalized into 
housing wealth but home price levels are not, we estimate the model as follows: 
                                                                      
                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                      
            is the coefficient of interest, capturing the difference-in-difference estimate of 
the housing wealth effect. Intuitively, the model compares renters and homeowners in 
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the same housing market to see whether the effect of homeownership on elderly labor 
supply in influenced by the magnitude of housing price changes in that MSA. 
1.4.3 Extensions to a Non-linear Model 
        In our difference-in-difference specifications, the first dependent variable is a 
dummy for labor force participation; hence a probit/logit model is expected to more 
accurately model the potential non-linear relationship. For example, under a non-linear 
logit specification, equation (1) becomes: 
                            
 
                                            
                              
        The interacted variables are dummy variables for bust and homeowner, so the 
interaction effect is the discrete double difference given as: 
 
 
      
      
 
 
                                      
 
 
           
 
 
           
 
 
      
              
        In equation (2), the interacted homeowner dummy variable and change in HPI 
produce a continuous variable. As such, the interaction effect is the discrete difference 
with respect to homeownership (our treatment variable) of the single derivative with 
respect to housing price growth: 
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 {                   }
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)               {               } (5) 
        However, prior to the work of Ai and Norton (2003) most studies instead presented 
the marginal effect of the interaction term incorrectly as       . The influential Ai and 
Norton contribution proposes a more accurate way to estimate the magnitude of effect 
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and standard errors for the interaction term in cases with these characteristics.            
Following their work, we present the estimated marginal effect as: 
      
           
      
                                                                                      
and the estimate of consistent asymptotic variance of      
5
 is: 
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where       is a consistent covariance estimator of      . 
        Borrowing statistical software packages from Ai and Norton (2003), our later 
results provide the accurate magnitude and statistical significance for the interaction 
terms in equations (1) and (2). 
1.4.4 Longitudinal Estimations 
        We argued previously that studies in this area often run into difficulties claiming 
identification of casual effects, due to endogeneity issues associated with self-reported 
housing wealth. In other applications, instrumental variable approaches have proven 
useful in overcoming similar challenges. However, while housing wealth is plausibly 
affected by social/economic/demographic household characteristics and other housing 
related variables (including the decision to purchase, choice over mortgage instrument, 
the extent to which equity is withdrawn through refinancing or additional mortgages, 
and early pay-down of mortgage principle), all these same variables influence labor 
supply directly, making them poor instruments. Since our analysis also examines the 
impact of housing wealth on elderly labor supply without the benefit of an 
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 The derivation is based on application of the Delta method as            
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uncontaminated instrument, we adopt various strategies to mitigate potential 
endogeneity bias, taking advantage of highly volatile conditions that created shocks to 
housing wealth that are plausibly unexpected/exogenous. In this sense, we follow the 
same empirical strategy seen in recent papers considering the effect of housing wealth 
on other household level behaviors (e.g., Lovenheim 2011, Lovenheim and Mumford 
2013; Lovenheim and Reynolds 2013). 
        As noted previously, there are two concerns plaguing models using self-reported 
housing wealth. One threat is that even though the HRS contains a detailed set of 
household level descriptives, it is still possible that unobserved factors that 
simultaneously affect labor supply and housing wealth exist. Cross-sectional estimation 
fails to account for these factors. Another concern comes from the underlying nature of 
the cross-sectional variation in housing wealth. Specifically, elderly households may 
initially decide among their housing related options having already formed plans that 
involve supplying specific amount of future labor. As such, cross-sectional correlations 
between the two may suffer from reverse causality bias. Fortunately, the longitudinal 
nature of the HRS data provides a mechanism for mitigating potential bias associated 
with either concern. 
        A simple cross-sectional model of elderly labor supply model begins as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                 (8) 
where labor outcome includes a vector of alternative labor supply measures, including 
labor force participation, working status (further distinguishing between part-time and 
full-time work), and annual hours worked.     contains our main variables of interest 
including housing wealth, property taxes, and financial assets.     contains other 
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observed control variables regarding health, demographics, local unemployment rate 
and tax burden rate, and region and wave dummies.  
        Following (Liker, Angustyniak, and Duncan 1985), the common doubts about 
measurement error of self-reported data define a variable of interest as: 
      
                                                                                             
where    is the true value of interest, and response bias and error are assumed to follow 
a random term of      and autocorrelation component of         . Under OLS estimation, 
we have the estimated coefficient for variables of interest given as: 
            
        
   
       
       
 
                                    
        Conversely, from a first-differenced model, we have a new estimator given as: 
            
  
                                
                          
where                                       . 
        Comparing between the two, three clear advantages of a first-differenced model 
surface. First, unobserved person-specific characteristics that affect both labor supply 
and housing wealth drop out of the first-differenced estimation. Second, if respondents 
are more likely to persistently overstate (understate) their housing and financial wealth, 
such that   is believed to be positive (negative) and significant, this bias is mitigated. 
Third, first differenced self-reported values are more accurate than the reported level 
values, since a portion of persistent memory error can be ruled out.  
        Our HRS data track households from 1991 through 2010, such that we can observe 
changing labor behaviors, as well as changes in housing wealth, property taxes, and 
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other financial assets over time. We first-difference the data for each observation
6
 and 
estimate the following regression model for elderly homeowners: 
                                                                                              
                                                                                                        
where                    represents the wave-to-wave changes in elderly labor supply 
along our three dimensions of interest.  
        Measures of labor participation, working status and annual working hours follow 
the same definition discussed previously.                         ,                     and 
                  are the first-differenced values of the original variables. Hence, the 
coefficients β1, β2, and β3 each represent an inter-temporal labor supply elasticity, since 
they estimate the change in labor supply resulting from a percentage change in the 
variable of interest.    reflects the effect of respondent‟s time varying health status and 
is expected to sow that degraded health forces elderly individuals to reduce their labor 
supply. Most of the variables in our vector of demographic controls are time invariant, 
such that they drop out after differencing.
7
 The exceptions are changes in age, which we 
do account for.    and    control for effects of the local unemployment rate and local 
tax burden, respectively. Wave dummies are still included and should now be 
interpreted as wave-to-wave transitions. 
                                                          
6
 As outlined in Section 3, this means subtracting the value of the variable reported two years early for 
the majority of cases. For a small minority of observations the gap between waves is three years. 
7
 The observed variation over time in educational attainment, number of children, and marital status is 
minimal and insufficient to analyze. As such, these variables are treated as time invariant. 
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1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Difference-in-Difference Results 
        The regression results presented in Table 1.5 provide our difference-in-difference 
estimate using HRS reported measures of housing wealth. [Insert Table 1.5 about here] 
We see clear evidence of significant housing wealth effects in the expected direction. 
From column (1), our interaction term of interest suggests elderly homeowners 
suffering through the housing bust period are 2.3 percent more likely to work than 
otherwise similar renters. The coefficient for homeowner status additionally supports 
the importance of housing wealth effects. Holding other factors constant, homeowners 
are 3.3 percent less likely to work than renters who do not accumulate housing wealth. 
Additionally, property tax burdens seem to have the expected countervailing positive 
effect on labor supply, while financial wealth impacts labor supply negatively. Column 
(2) shifts to an examination of work status, taking the different intensities of full-time 
and part-time work into account. All the results from the participation model carry over 
and, in fact, strengthen in terms of their intensity. However, there is weaker evidence 
coming from the model explaining hours worked, which is displayed in column (3). 
Although both the homeowner variable and the interaction term of interest retain 
coefficients of roughly the same size as the work status model, statistical significance in 
lost on the interaction term. One possibility is that the housing bust period negatively 
correlates with demand for labor on the intensive margin, (i.e., a lackluster economy), 
and thus downwardly biases the potential effect of loss in home equity during the bust 
period. Another is that the underlying data generating process determining hours 
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worked is simply more complicated – as we see the R² for this model drops and the 
standard errors on nearly all our variables increase. 
        Turning to our models measuring housing wealth using MSA level HPIs, we 
provide our dif-in-dif regression results in Table 1.6. [Insert Table 1.6 about here] 
Column (1) reflects our model of labor participation and again suggests both housing 
wealth and property taxes play the offsetting roles we expected. Our interaction term of 
interest is significant at the 5% level and indicates elderly homeowners from regions 
with high housing price appreciation are less likely to work, whereas higher property 
tax burdens are associated with elderly homeowners working with a higher probability. 
Similarly, we see the same pattern when moving to the model of work status reported in 
column (2), again with an increase in the estimated magnitude of the effect (although 
the two point estimates do not differ significantly from one another). Column (3) again 
provides less evidence that housing wealth influences the intensive margin of labor 
supply. 
        Although they are not a main focus of our study, a brief discussion of the estimated 
effects of our other explanatory variables is merited. In general: 
 Better (poorer) health is associated with increased (decreased) labor supply. Our 
estimates are consistently statistically and economically significant and agree 
with a large number of studies showing these same effects. 
 Our labor force participation and work status models suggest respondents from 
regions with higher unemployment rates are less likely to work, whereas the 
unemployment rate was not found to influence hours worked. 
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 Respondents with higher local tax burdens are less likely to work.8 
 Females are less likely to work than males. Gender carries the strongest effect of 
any of our variables – even more influential than health. 
 Married individuals are less likely to work than single individuals. 
 While children make working more likely in terms of statistical significance, the 
estimated magnitude of the effect is small. Using the coefficients from our labor 
force participation models, each child raises the likelihood of working by about 
one tenth of one percent. So for example, the estimated effect of being married, 
which works in the opposite direction, is estimated as anywhere from 30 to 
nearly 100 times larger depending on the specification. 
 Aging brings monotonically decreasingly likelihoods of working and reductions 
in hours worked. 
 Black, Hispanic, and Asian workers all participate in the labor market at higher 
rates than whites, but significant differences are only retained in the hours 
worked model for individuals of Asian and Pacific Islander descent. 
 More highly educated respondents are more likely to work, but are also less 
likely to work long hours. Both are consistent with studies that consider the 
income and substitution effects associated with earning higher wages (i.e., which 
have been shown to correlate with income.) 
        As discussed in Section IV., the magnitude and statistical significance of the 
interaction effect varies by observation. The results for corrected interaction effects of 
housing price index growth and homeowner status are illustrated in Figure 1.7.1 [Insert 
                                                          
8
 Property taxes have been controlled for through the variable of self-reported tax liabilities. Net of 
property tax burdens, more variation in local tax burden rate is income tax, either reducing the purchasing 
power of earnings, or serving as a disincentive to work. 
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Figure 1.7.1 about here] It shows that interaction effects of housing wealth and 
homeowner status are always negative, and the statistical significance is persistently 
strong (see Figure 1.7.2).  [Insert Figure 1.7.2 about here] 
        Since we move from our difference-in-difference models to a longitudinal first-
differenced model in the next section, we lose a majority of the socioeconomic control 
variables since they do not change (or change very little) over time. Finally, since these 
explorations clearly reveal gender plays a strong role in determining labor outcomes, we 
later present the results of models that separately consider male and female labor supply, 
finding interesting gendered effects relating to housing wealth. 
1.5.2 Longitudinal Results 
        Table 1.7 displays the estimation results for our first-differenced regression models 
on homeowners‟ labor supply. [Insert Table 1.7 about here] We narrow the focus to 
homeowners since reported changes in housing wealth and property taxes – our two 
variables most directly of interest – rarely change for renters.9 Column (1) reports the 
results concerning labor force participation for regressions including both genders. The 
estimated coefficient for housing wealth is -0.0026, suggesting that a ten percent 
increase in housing wealth reduces elderly homeowners‟ likelihood of being in the labor 
force by just over 2.5 percent. The coefficient on the property tax variable is also 
significant and positive as we expected. We also see the significant negative effect of 
financial assets, with a marginal effect of -0.0019, somewhat smaller than the 
coefficient on housing wealth, but we note the size of these effects cannot be 
distinguished from one another at conventional levels of certainly. That is to say, we 
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 Renters could conceivably still experience changes in housing wealth if, for example, they owned 
rental property other than their residence. In practice, this is far too rare to consider in our analysis. 
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would fail to reject a null hypothesis that variation in housing wealth exhibits the same 
effect as variation in financial wealth. 
        Touching briefly on the other explanatory variables in our longitudinal models, 
reiterating that most have dropped out since they do not vary over time, we find 
evidence that: 
 Poor health status lowers the likelihood of staying in the labor force. 
 Elderly workers facing higher local tax burdens are more likely to stay in the 
labor force. 
 Facing worsening local employment conditions, elderly individuals are less 
likely to stay in the labor force.  
 Aging brings monotonically decreasingly likelihoods of working. 
These effects are all consistent with those from the difference-in-difference models. 
1.5.2.1 Heterogeneous Responses by Gender 
        The second and third columns of results in Table 7 represent models of labor 
participation run separately for males and females. We find that in response to a ten 
percent increase in housing wealth; elderly females are less likely to work by 3.5 
percent, whereas insufficient evidence is present to claim elderly males are influenced. 
When property tax liabilities increase by ten percent, women experience an increase in 
the likelihood of working of just over 5 percent, whereas for men the effect is around 
3.7 percent. Additionally, the estimated effect of financial assets on male labor force 
participation is pinned relatively precisely to zero, whereas the effect on female 
participation is still significant and of nearly the same estimated magnitude as the 
housing wealth effect. In this context, we note that our models examine behaviors of 
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older workers, who may (or may not) have more traditional cultural attitudes towards 
gender roles than younger households. 
        These potentially interesting age and cohort related effects at the very least 
motivate a closer examination of full and part-time work status, as previous studies have 
shown short and/or interrupted spells are more likely for women than they are for 
men(e.g., Polachek 1981; Becker 1985; Fuchs 1989; Vella 1994). Table 1.8 presents the 
estimation results concerning a work status model as previously outlined. [Insert Table 
1.8 about here] All the coefficient estimates for our housing and financial wealth 
variables continue to be significant with expected sign in the regression using both 
genders (reported in column (1)). Columns (2) and (3) report the results of estimations 
using only females and males, respectively. The estimated marginal effects suggest that 
when housing wealth increases by ten percent, elderly males experience a 4.6 percent 
decrease in the value of their work status, whereas elderly women experience roughly a 
4.0 percent decline. Similarly, a ten percent increase in property taxes leads to a 7 
percent increase among elderly males, compared to a 6.9 percent increase for females. 
In both cases, the effect of gender in these specifications seems to dampen, with 
statistically insignificant differences for both the housing variables across gender 
specific subsamples. The data provides an explanation for the divergence between the 
nature of gendered effects shown in Tables 7 and 8, as we find it is more common for 
males to make more severe labor transitions (i.e., from full-time work directly to no 
work), whereas females make transitions to part-time work at higher rates than their 
male counterparts – consistent with the previous findings that motivated this additional 
investigation. 
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1.5.2.2 Heterogeneous Responses across Age Groups 
        One advantage of the HRS data is that we have a sufficient number of observations 
to investigate whether or not labor supply responses to changes in housing wealth and 
property taxes are heterogeneous over different age ranges. In particular, we are 
interested in whether near-retirement age workers (i.e., those into their 60s but not yet 
past 65) behave differently than workers of other ages when it comes to our main 
effects of interest. To explore this possibility, labor force participation is examined 
separately for five distinct age groups: individuals under 55, those age 55 to 61, those 
age 62 to 65, those age 66 to 72, and finally, those age 73 to 79.
10
 
        The results concerning potentially differential responses by age are presented in 
Columns (1) through (5) of Table 1.9. [Insert Table 1.9 about here] Beginning with the 
youngest group of workers, we column (1) suggests labor force participation is not 
related to changes in housing wealth or property taxes, but interestingly enough, does 
respond to changes in financial wealth. However, columns (2) indicates the influence of 
both housing related variables come back into play, quite strongly in fact, when workers 
are in their later 50s to very early 60s. Unsurprisingly though, the effect of housing 
wealth seems to wane when we focus narrowly on workers close to reaching ages that 
define eligibility for Social Security and/or pensions. Column (3) reports a statistically 
insignificant relationship with housing wealth, but does still retain the positive effect of 
higher property taxes on labor force participation – although we note the level of 
significance drops to the 10% level. Once past the ages representing critical eligibility 
thresholds, the significant effects of housing wealth resurface. Colum (4) shows that for 
                                                          
10
 Workers age 80 and above constitute a very small portion of the data. Additionally, the lack of 
significant effects in the model of this oldest age group is not sensitive to their inclusion/exclusion. 
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workers age 66-72, a ten percent increase in housing wealth leads to over 4.5 percent 
increase in likelihood of working. Perhaps unsurprisingly, we find very few significant 
determinants of elderly labor supply when focusing on workers aged 73 and up, with 
only declines in health impacting their likelihood of working. We affectionately predict 
this group likely includes many workers that truly love their work, and desire to 
continue without much reaction to financial incentives. 
        Figure 1.8 shows how our estimated coefficients (and significance levels) of 
interest, describing the effect of housing wealth on labor force participation changes as 
age increases.
11
 Using moving windows of five year, a w-shaped curve emerges. This 
supports the results from Table 9, showing heterogeneous effects across age groups, 
relating to the proximity to the conventional retirement age. In all specifications, health 
limitations are a major determinant of labor outcome.  
1.5.2.3 Further Extensions regarding Hours Worked 
        In this section, we return to the intensive margin of labor supply, considering hours 
worked. Table 1.10 provides the estimation results for a first-differenced specification 
exploring annual hours worked for our full sample, males, females, and working 
couples, respectively. The full sample, male only, and female only result all show 
insignificant effects of housing wealth and property taxes. One explanation for this lack 
of significance may be that elderly workers have less discretion over hours worked than 
they do over choices to exit the labor force entirely. Another interesting possibility is 
that elderly couples make joint work decisions, such that when housing wealth effects 
are accounted for–one member of the household primarily reacts. In this case, the 
                                                          
11
 Results are from the estimation as equation (12). 
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housing wealth effects presented in columns (1), (2) and (3) would all be biased towards 
zero. In extreme cases, reactions of the two workers in a household could even move in 
opposite directions, for example if positive wealth shocks caused the household to 
transition from two workers to a single worker, but the single worker remaining 
supplied labor more intensively. 
        To account for this possibility, we examine working couples in column (4). We 
find that a ten percent increase in housing wealth leads to a 3.2 percent reduction in 
overall hours worked, measured at the household level. A ten percent increase in 
property taxes is found to increase hours worked by 11.8 percent. Hence, it seems 
elderly household‟s response in joint hours worked returns to a similar story as the one 
shown from labor participation. 
1.5.2.4 Robustness Checks 
        To explore potentially asymmetric effects regarding the working-to-exited versus 
exited-to-working transitions, we also estimate non-linear multinomial logit models. 
Table 1.11 displays computed marginal effects from these estimations. [Insert Table 
1.11 about here.] The results show housing wealth only influence elderly homeowners‟ 
decisions to exit the labor force, with an insignificant effect on the exited-to-working 
transition. On the other hand, property taxes influence both directional transitions 
significantly. We caution that these results are not surprising, given that our data carries 
far more cases of exiting the labor force than the reverse. It lies beyond the scope of our 
study to comment on whether a similar asymmetry would surface in other age groups 
where entry and exit occur with more similar frequency. 
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        We also looked at specific subsamples as another simple robustness check. First, 
since households may reduce (increase) their consumption of housing in respond losses 
(gains) in housing wealth; we additionally consider the subsample of non-movers. We 
argue that a restriction to non-movers can, at the very least, mitigate any concerns 
associated with this issue. Our access to restricted geographic information of 
households from the HRS data allows us to identify household mobility status – 
verifying the household resided in the same location over multiple waves. The effects of 
housing wealth and property taxes, as well as key control variables including financial 
wealth and health status, all register highly similar effects. While not included, these 
results are available upon request. Furthermore, in the regressions using only non-
movers, the gender-specific and age-related patterns still surface. In a final robustness 
check, we find our main results are retained when we include various cohort groupings. 
1.6 Conclusion 
        Over the last two decades, elderly labor supply has become increasingly important, 
due to a rapidly aging labor force and a strong reversal of the previous trends towards 
earlier retirement. Evidence suggests most elderly households carry a large fraction of 
their asset portfolios in the form of home equity, while at the same time facing a relative 
lack of other liquid financial assets. In this paper, we use HRS data from 1991 through 
2010 to investigate the effects of housing wealth, property taxes, and other financial 
wealth on labor outcomes. Our work benefits from examining a period with a clear 
housing market boom and a subsequent collapse, beginning in 2007. The rapid and 
unexpected fluctuations in home prices over this period led to plausibly exogenous 
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variation in two key housing variables – housing wealth and property taxes – providing 
a setting for examining their effects on elderly labor supply. 
        We find consistent evidence that labor supply elasticity with respect to housing 
wealth and property taxes are both statistically and economic significantly, and of the 
nature predicted by the life-cycle model. Our findings suggest elderly homeowners are 
approximately 4.5 percent more likely to work if their property taxes increase by ten 
percent. Conversely, a ten percent increases in housing wealth raises the likelihood of 
working by about 2.5 percent. Across a number of specifications, changes in housing 
wealth display effects similar to those of financial wealth. This validates the idea that 
lower income elderly households, who are revealed by the data to have large 
concentrations of their overall wealth held in the housing sector, are particularly 
vulnerable to unexpected shocks to the value of their home. 
        Likely due to traditional gender roles and specialization in home/work production, 
we also identify important differences between male and female labor responses to both 
housing variables. Elderly female labor force participation is more responsive to 
changes in housing wealth than elderly male labor supply. Moreover, we find that age 
influences the nature of the effect of housing wealth. Current labor supply from workers 
in their late 50s and late 60s is found to be more responsive to changes in housing 
wealth than labor outcomes for workers still in their early 50s or very close to the 
traditional retirement age (65). Workers well beyond traditional retirement ages (i.e., 73 
years and above), are found to be unresponsive to changes in either housing wealth or 
property taxes – perhaps an indication workers in these age ranges are unlikely to be 
working simply based on financial incentives.  
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        While our study provides evidence that we argue answers several important 
questions relating to elderly labor supply, it leaves others unaddressed. For example, we 
find no evidence that plausibly exogenous changes in housing wealth influence the 
behavior of workers younger than age 55. However, it would be interesting to see if it 
influences these same workers in other ways that we are not focusing on in this study. 
Similarly, as time passes and new cohorts – with gender roles that may differ from those 
of previous generations – age into their 50s and 60s, it would be interesting to see if the 
strongly gendered effects. 
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Table 1.1: The Composition of Entry Cohorts in Our Analysis by Wave. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wave 
HRS AHEAD CODA WB EBB
1 1992 1992 NA NA NA
2 1994 1993 NA NA NA
3 1996 1995 NA NA NA
4 1998 1998 1998 1998 NA
5 2000 2000 2000 2000 NA
6 2002 2002 2002 2002 NA
7 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
8 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006
9 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008
10 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010
Individual-wave obs. 10413 7758 4210 3488 3623
Entry Cohorts
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Table 1.2: Labor Participation Rate by Age and Housing Wealth Quintile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0-25%(low) 25-50% 50-75% 75-100%(high)
50-52 66.13 % 74.54 % 78.95 % 80.37 %
53-55 64.46 % 72.72 % 76.69 % 78.35 %
56-58 58.04 % 69.09 % 70.59 % 72.19 %
59-61 50.78 % 61.05 % 62.03 % 63.04 %
62-64 38.23 % 44.07 % 46.07 % 50.18 %
64-67 28.12 % 31.05 % 32.90 % 36.37 %
68-70 22.18 % 25.40 % 26.40 % 29.49 %
71-73 14.81 % 18.84 % 19.47 % 22.16 %
74-76 10.39 % 13.37 % 14.47 % 17.41 %
77-79 6.05  % 9.28  % 10.97 % 11.98 %
Age
Housing wealth percentile
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Table 1.3: Description of Variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description Data source
Labor-related:
Labor force participation Dummy equals one if the respondent is currently work. RAND HRS
Working status Categorical variable that equals two if working full time, one if 
part time, and zero if not working.
RAND HRS
Annual hours worked Hours worked per week multiply weeks worked per year. RAND HRS
Wealth-related:
Homeownership Dummy equals one if self-reported home value is greater than 
zero.
RAND HRS
Home assets The total value of the primary residence. RAND HRS
Housing wealth The value of the primary residence less mortgages and home 
loan.
RAND HRS
Property tax Self-reported property tax liabilities paid last year. HRS
Financial assets Sum of stocks, mutual funds, investment trusts, checking, 
savings, money market accounts, government saving bonds, 
other bonds and all other savings.
RAND HRS
Financial wealth Net value of non-housing financial wealth, calculated by 
substracting non-mortgage debts  from the sum of stocks, mutual 
funds, investment trusts, checking, savings, money market 
accounts, government saving bonds, other bonds and all other 
savings. 
RAND HRS
Demographics:
Cohort Five cohort dummies: HRS, AHEAD, CODA, WB and EBB. RAND HRS
Age Age in years. RAND HRS
Age group 11 age group dummies of 44-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-61, 62-63, 64-
65, 66-67, 68-69, 70-74, 75-79, and 80+.
Health Categorical variable that equals five if self-report health is poor, 
four if fair, three if good, four if very good, and five if excellent.
RAND HRS
Female Dummy equals one if the respondent is female. RAND HRS
Number of children Number of children within the household. RAND HRS
Married Dummy equals one if the respondent is married. RAND HRS
Race Four race dummies of white, black, hispanic and other racial 
group. 
RAND HRS
Education year Number of years that the respondent spent in school. RAND HRS
Education degree Four education degree dummies of no degree, high school, 
college and above, and other degree.
RAND HRS
Location & wave:
Wave Ten wave dummies 1991 through 2010. RAND HRS
Census region Four census region dummies of northeast, midwest, west, and 
south.
RAND HRS
Housing price index MSA specific housing price index Federal Housing Finance 
AgencyLocal tax burden rate State specific local tax burden rate. Tax Foundation
Unemployment rate MSA specific unemployment rate aggregated from counties. Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics of Observations in the Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
obs Mean Std. Min Max Mean Std. Mean Std.
Labor-related:
      Labor force participation 127,336 0.4056 0.4910 0 1 0.4297 0.4950 0.3007 0.4586
      Labor force participation (boom) 68,653 0.3860 0.4868 0 1 0.4121 0.4922 0.2751 0.4466
      Labor force participation (bust) 20,063 0.3446 0.4752 0 1 0.3693 0.4826 0.2400 0.4272
      Working status 127,336 0.6765 0.8722 0 2 0.7144 0.8795 0.5114 0.8192
      Working status (boom) 68,653 0.6343 0.8537 0 2 0.6759 0.8641 0.4581 0.7836
      Working status (bust) 20,063 0.5487 0.8099 0 2 0.5855 0.8217 0.3928 0.7376
      Annual hours worked 50,065 1,826.75 821.1762 0 8,736 1,816.451 823.4542 1,891.659 803.6989
      Annual hours worked (boom) 25,554 1,797.097 841.7751 0 8736 1,787.397 842.891 1,859.576 831.9664
      Annual hours worked (bust) 6,657 1,678.674 837.978 0 6240 1,663.996 834.5813 1,775.23 854.1558
Wealth-related:
      Homeownership 127,336 0.8135 0.3895 0 1
      Home assets 127,336 136,365 155,324 0 4,000,000 167,619.2 156,256.9 0 0
      Housing wealth 127,336 110,537.8 132,882.5 1 1,000,000 135,872.2 135,139.3 0 0
   △log(Housing wealth) 102,158 -1.1719 2.8941 -13.8155 13.7102 0.2992 2.1349 -2.2189 4.4512
      Property tax 127,336 1383.654 1761.879 0 55,000 1700.78 1810.063 0 0
   △log(property tax) 93,833 -0.0524 1.7494 -9.7981 10.2400 0.1734 1.4507 -1 2.4415
      Financial assets 127,336 104,523.8 212,879.9 0 2,660,000 115,768.9 221,919.1 55,460.35 158,783.3
   △log(Financial assets) 95,122 0.0676 1.7358 -12.2086 11.8133 0.0847 1.6635 -0.0153 2.0487
Demographics:
Age (in years) 127,336 66.68 10.8 44 107 65.827 10.15 70.38 12.60
Health (in a 5-point scale) 127,336 3.2646 1.1191 1 5 3.3491 1.0909 2.8962 1.1650
Female 127,336 0.5703 0.4950 0 1 0.5523 0.4973 0.6489 0.4773
Number of children 127,336 3.0995 2.0532 0 22 3.1075 1.9826 3.0647 2.3363
Married 127,336 0.7015 0.4576 0 1 0.7750 0.4176 0.3805 0.4855
Race dummies
       White 127,336 0.8288 0.3767 0 1 0.8533 0.3538 0.7217 0.4482
       Black 127,336 0.0964 0.2951 0 1 0.0811 0.2730 0.1630 0.3694
       Hispanic 127,336 0.0555 0.2289 0 1 0.0485 0.2148 0.0860 0.2803
       Other race 127,336 0.0194 0.1378 0 1 0.0171 0.1296 0.0293 0.1686
Education (in years) 127,336 12.5852 2.9288 1 17 12.7792 2.8276 11.7383 3.1996
Education degree dummies
        No degree 127,336 0.2026 0.4019 0 1 0.1771 0.3818 0.3136 0.4640
        High school 127,336 0.5949 0.4909 0 1 0.6039 0.4891 0.5557 0.4969
        College & above 127,336 0.2015 0.4011 0 1 0.2179 0.4128 0.1301 0.3364
        Other degree 127,336 0.0010 0.0318 0 1 0.0011 0.0302 0.0006 0.0251
Year 127,337 2000.928 5.5245 1992 2011 2000.86 5.5349 2001.227 5.4686
MSA level housing price index growth (in%) 121,226 3.8331 6.6041 -37.93797 33.0980 3.7997 6.5218 3.9762 6.9439
MSA level unemployment rate (in%) 127,003 5.8791 2.3697 1.4653 31.10975 5.8720 2.3756 5.9102 2.3437
State level local tax burden (in%) 127,020 9.6221 1.2026 4.8 12.78 9.5789 1.1747 9.8109 1.3008
Total Homeowners Renters
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Table 1.5: Difference-in-Difference Estimation of Housing Bust with Boom (1997-2006) 
and Bust (2007-2010). 
 
Note: Housing wealth, property taxes, and financial assets are naturally logged. Covariates not shown in 
this table also include wave dummies and a set of age group dummies. 
Participation Working status Working hours
(1) (2) (3) 
Bust 0.00674 0.01521 -0.09492
(0.0082) (0.0138) (0.0706)
Homeowner -0.03312*** -0.06059*** -0.06585*
(0.0072) (0.0120) (0.0257)
Bust*homeowner 0.02291*** 0.03444*** 0.03477
(0.0081) (0.0135) (0.0309)
Property tax 0.00855*** 0.01333*** 0.00180
(0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0032)
Financial wealth -0.00490*** -0.00872*** -0.01238***
(0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0022)
Health 0.06810*** 0.11141*** 0.02515***
(0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0046)
Unemployment rate
-0.00622*** -0.01027*** -0.00118
(0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0027)
Local tax burden -0.00502*** -0.00796*** 0.00196
(0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0039)
Female -0.10166*** -0.21409*** -0.23889***
(0.0028) (0.0047) (0.0090)
Number of children 0.00122* 0.0009 0.00427*
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0023)
Married -0.03669*** -0.08040*** -0.11547***
(0.0033) (0.0056) (0.0112)
Hispanic 0.00433 0.02354** -0.01976
(0.0060) (0.0101) (0.0189)
Black 0.01003** 0.01740** -0.02327
(0.0048) (0.0080) (0.0149)
Otherrace 0.02575*** 0.05889*** 0.08310***
(0.0095) (0.0159) (0.0267)
High school 0.03343*** 0.05892*** -0.00295***
(0.0038) (0.0063) (0.0146)
College 0.09233*** 0.14981*** -0.08507***
(0.0048) (0.0080) (0.0166)
Other degree 0.00609 -0.01320 -0.17002
(0.0400) (0.0670) (0.1207)
R^2 0.3312 0.3820 0.1707
N 88,619 88,619 32,045
*, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Variable
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Table 1.6: Difference-in-difference Estimation of Housing Price Index Growth Effect. 
 
 
Labor participation Working status Working hours
(1) (2) (3) 
Hpi_growth 0.00123*** 0.00230*** 0.00357***
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0014)
Homeowner -0.02807*** -0.05042*** -0.05905***
(0.0064) (0.0109) (0.0219)
Hpi_growth*homeowner
-0.00085** -0.00136* -0.0009
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0015)
Property tax 0.00862*** 0.01302*** 0.00284
(0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0027)
Financial wealth -0.00510*** -0.00954*** -0.01222***
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0018)
Health 0.07047*** 0.11722*** 0.02173***
(0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0036)
Unemployment rate -0.00420*** -0.0074*** 0.00137
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0020)
Local tax burden -0.00345*** -0.00548*** -0.00080
(0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0031)
Female -0.10996*** -0.23786*** -0.24736***
(0.0024) (0.0041) (0.0072)
Number of children 0.00109* 0.00034 0.00306*
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0018)
Married -0.0410*** -0.09082*** -0.10358***
(0.0029) (0.0049) (0.0091)
Hispanic 0.01102** 0.03233*** -0.0279*
(0.0052) (0.0089) (0.0152)
Black 0.01863*** 0.03155*** -0.01507
(0.0040) (0.0069) (0.0115)
Otherrace 0.02163*** 0.05614*** 0.07669***
(0.0082) (0.0141) (0.0219)
High school 0.03357*** 0.05947*** -0.00065
(0.0032) (0.0054) (0.0111)
College 0.09257*** 0.15387*** -0.06890***
(0.0040) (0.0069) (0.0128)
Other degree 0.02544 0.02990 -0.06276
(0.0360) (0.0615) (0.0991)
R^2 0.3466 0.3917 0.1663
N 121,358 121,358 47,008
Variable
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 
1% level. 
 45 
Table 1.7: Longitudinal Model of Labor Force Participation of Homeowners. 
 
Note: Housing wealth, property taxes, and financial assets are naturally logged. Covariates not shown in 
this table also include wave dummies and a set of age group dummies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both genders The female The male
(1) (2) (3) 
△Housing wealth -0.00260*** -0.00346*** -0.00162
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0011)
△Property tax 0.00448*** 0.00513*** 0.00369**
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0015)
△Financial wealth
-0.00190** -0.00296*** -0.00038
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0012)
△Health 0.01253*** 0.01215*** 0.01245***
(0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0022)
△Unemployment 
rate
-0.00254* -0.00033 -0.00607***
(0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0021)
△Local tax burden
0.02530*** 0.02188*** 0.02921***
(0.0039) (0.0052) (0.0059)
R^2 0.0103 0.0089 0.0130
N 72,713 40,069 32,644
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% 
level. 
Variable
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Table 1.8: Longitudinal Model of Working Decisions of Homeowners (full-time/ part-
time/no work). 
 
Note: Housing wealth, property taxes, and financial assets are naturally logged. Covariates not shown in 
this table also include wave dummies and age group dummies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both genders The female The male
(1) (2) (3) 
△Housing wealth -0.00414*** -0.00396*** -0.00456**
(0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0018)
△Property tax 0.00695*** 0.00687*** 0.00715***
(0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0026)
△Financial wealth -0.00374*** -0.00520*** -0.00160
(0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0021)
△Health 0.02202*** 0.02099*** 0.022801***
(0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0037)
△Unemployment rate -0.00564** -0.00142 -0.01084***
(0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0035)
△Local tax burden 0.04691*** 0.04122*** 0.05303***
(0.0065) (0.0085) (0.0100)
R^2 0.0173 0.0128 0.0234
N 72,713 40,069 32,644
Variable
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 1.9: Labor Force Participation: Heterogeneous Effects across Age Groups. 
 
Note: Housing wealth, property taxes, and financial assets are naturally logged. Covariates not shown in 
this table also include wave dummies and age group dummies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
younger than 55  age 55-61 age 62-65 age 66-72 age 73-79
(pre-retirement age) (retirement age) (post-retirement age)
△Housing wealth -0.00135 -0.00422*** -0.00244 -0.00461*** -0.00149
(0.00193) (0.00132) (0.00203) (0.00163) (0.00165)
△Property tax 0.00377 0.00716*** 0.00585* 0.00587*** 0.00068
(0.00148) (0.00207) (0.00312) (0.00226) (0.00206)
△Financial wealth -0.00667*** -0.00037 -0.00352 -0.00337* -0.00027
(0.00244) (0.00157) (0.00242) (0.00180) (0.00154)
△Health 0.02431*** 0.01442*** 0.01096** 0.01352*** 0.01053***
(0.00494) (0.00311) (0.00471) (0.00347) (0.00275)
Age(in years) -0.00442*** -0.00679*** -0.01693*** -0.00633*** -0.00169
(0.00182) (0.00133) (0.00352) (0.00146) (0.00124)
R^2 0.0070 0.0054 0.0059 0.0048 0.0013
N 6,492 18,861 11,368 15,517 12,425
Variable
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 1.10: Longitudinal Model of Working Hours. 
 
Note: Housing wealth, property taxes, and financial assets are naturally logged. Covariates not shown in 
this table also include wave dummies and a set of age group dummies. Column (4) restrains the sample to 
the working couples, so spouse's age group dummies are also included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both genders The female The male Working couples
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
△Housing wealth 0.00083 -0.00410 -0.00254 -0.00322**
(0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0014)
△Property tax 0.00459 0.00580 0.00319 0.01180***
(0.0031) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0023)
△Financial wealth 0.00093 -0.00076 -0.00270 -0.00174
(0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0016)
△Health 0.01450*** 0.01170* 0.01644*** 0.02541
(0.0044) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0031)
△Unemployment rate -0.00118 -0.00534 0.00266 0.00132
(0.0041) (0.0056) (0.0058) (0.0030)
△Local tax burden 0.02463* 0.01960 0.03009 0.02397**
(0.0131) (0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0099)
R^2 0.0085 0.0063 0.0126 0.0187
N 26,381 13,306 13,075 12,612
Variable
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 1.11: Asymmetric Effects on Labor Force Exit and Reentry. 
 
Note: Housing wealth, property taxes, and financial assets are naturally logged. Covariates not shown in 
this table also include wave dummies and age group dummies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2)Enter (3)Exit (5)Enter (6)Exit (8)Enter (9)Exit
Housing wealth -0.00018 0.00222*** 0.00031 0.00188** -0.00058 0.00253***
(0.00034) (0.00052) (0.00122) (0.00088) (0.00045) (0.00066)
Property tax 0.00168*** -0.00250*** 0.00105 -0.00226* 0.00208*** -0.00266***
(0.00049) (0.00077) (0.00385) (0.00122) (0.00065) (0.00098)
Financial wealth -0.00066* 0.00113* 0.00045 0.00082 -0.00147*** 0.00132*
(0.00039) (0.00060) (0.00172) (0.00099) (0.00051) (0.00077)
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level. 
Variable
Homeowners The male homeowners The female homeowners
multinomial logit multinomial logit multinomial logit
 50 
Figure 1.1: Labor Force Participation Rates for All Civilian Workers, by Age, 
Seasonally Adjusted, 1948-2010. 
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, various years. Shaded areas represent 
recessions, as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
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Figure 1.2: Fraction of Elderly Workers in Full-time and Part-time Employment, 1977-
2007. 
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, various years. 
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Figure 1.3.1: The 120-year Historical Trend of Home Values in the U.S., 1890-2013. 
 
Note: US national index levels, not seasonally adjusted. Historic prices are inflation adjusted February 
2014 dollars. Min: 69.44 (1919). Max: 223.05 (2005). 
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Figure 1.3.2: The Recent 20-year Home Values and Appreciation Rate in the U.S.,1990-
2011. 
 
Figure 1.3.3: the recent 20-year HECM loans and the average property values.  
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Figure 1.4: Percentage Breakdown, by cohort, HRS data sample, 1991-2010 
 
Figure 1.5: Labor Behaviors of Full-time, Part-time and Not Work by Age Group. 
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Figure 1.6.1: Assets Allocation of Elderly Households within Our Analysis 1991-2010. 
 
Figure 1.6.2: Real Growth Rate of Home Value and HPI Appreciation.  
 
Footnotes: The MSA-specific housing price index are aggregated to national level, weighed by local 
population and deflated by consumer price index. 
Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency, 1990-2010. 
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Figure 1.7.1 Interaction Effect of Housing Price Index Growth and Homeowner Status 
as a Function of the Predicted Probability of Labor Participation. 
 
Figure 1.7.2: Z-statistics as a Function of the Predicted Probability of Labor 
Participation. 
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Figure 1.8: Heterogeneous Effect of Housing Wealth across Age Groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58 
Chapter 2: Retirement and Unretirement during the Recent Housing 
Crisis 
2.1 Introduction 
        Over the recent boom/bust cycle in the housing market, the unusual volatility of 
prices surprised many homeowners. Importantly, studies established that older 
households have relatively greater wealth accumulated in the housing sector, while 
simultaneously experience more limited current or perspective income (Lusardi & 
Michell, 2007). Hence, older workers have strong incentives to closely monitor 
fluctuating housing market conditions over this period of turbulence. The unanticipated 
and prolonged nature of the housing market bubble provides a valuable opportunity to 
investigate the effects of housing wealth on older households‟ behaviors. Zhao and 
Burge (2015) provide evidence supportive to the idea that housing wealth and property 
taxes both influence current elderly labor supply in the predicted opposing directions. 
They also find heterogeneous responses by gender and across age groups, and that these 
informative patterns relate to marital status and the traditional retirement age range (mid 
60‟s). In this essay, I extend by evaluating the effects of housing wealth and property 
taxes on additional behaviors, including early retirement expectations, actual retirement 
timing, and potential post-retirement reentry (or unretirement).  
        If retirement planning is sensitive to gains/losses in housing wealth and property 
tax liabilities, it could have major implications for accurately evaluating the 
consequences of financial crises and understanding how to best apply government 
corrective fiscal policy. Despite its likely importance however, the role of housing 
wealth and property taxes on elderly labor supply has not received much attention in the 
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literature. Given the large aging population in the US (and abroad), and the fact that 
lower income elderly households have retirement portfolios that are highly skewed 
towards housing wealth, this is concerning. The existing work examining the influence 
of housing wealth on older workers‟ retirement behaviors focuses almost exclusively on 
retirement timing, finding mixed results (Sevak 2002; Farnham and Sevak 2007; Disney, 
Ratcliffe, and Smith 2010; Zhao 2011). Our study adds to the literature by exploring the 
dynamic aspects of retirement planning and subsequent retirement, as well as partial or 
complete reversal of the retirement at a later point in time. Importantly, we also employ 
restricted access Health and Retirement Study data that carries rich information and 
facilitates our estimation strategies, including hazard duration model, multinomial 
model and first difference model. 
        Most workers follow a traditional pattern of labor force participation by working 
full-time for several decades, and retiring in their mid 60‟s. However, in many other 
cases, traditional paths are not followed. In the extreme, older individuals may even 
reverse the initial retirement decision. Unretirement can be viewed as one stage of a 
gradual retirement process, possibly planned or caused by unanticipated poor wealth or 
income shocks. Prior research has found that early subjective expectations provide a 
strong prediction of eventual realizations of retirement behaviors (Bernheim 1989; 
Loughran et al. 2001; Disney and Tanner 1999). We take advantage of a unique 
subjective measure of expectations regarding retirement in the HRS to examine not only 
how housing wealth and property taxes influence retirement expectations, as well as 
unexpected deviations from these expectations in retirement behaviors.  
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        Specifically, we seek to extend the literature considering retirement behaviors in 
four ways. To our knowledge we are the first study to examine the effect of the liquidity 
constraints associated with property taxes on the retirement decision. Recent work has 
found evidence that property tax burdens during the recent housing boom affected 
elderly mobility (Shan, 2010) and labor force participation (Zhao and Burge, 2015). No 
previous research however, has addressed whether or not this liquidity constraint 
influences the timing of full retirement, one of the most important decisions among 
older households.  
        Second, most studies that investigate the effect of housing wealth on retirement 
decisions rely solely on quasi-experimental variation across regions and over time. 
While we also use variation of this nature for identification, we additionally use self-
reported home value estimates, adding another source of valuable information across 
individuals. By adding self-reported household measures, we can compare estimates 
investigating the determinants of retirement timing using alternative variables reflecting 
housing wealth.  
        Third, I explore early retirement expectations, actual retirement timing and 
potential post-retirement labor force reentry. Models of realized retirement decisions 
likely register the effect of housing wealth and property taxes on leisure. Our alternative 
model which focuses on early retirement expectations, allows us to examine how actual 
retirement outcomes deviate from previous expectations for individuals experiencing 
the boom/bust cycle of the housing market.  
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        Finally, the post-retirement labor force reentry model extends beyond the 
traditional hazard models used in most studies by investigating whether volatility in the 
housing market influences elder households during their post-retirement years.  
        The following section of our paper documents historical housing price dynamics 
that highlight the potential for an impact on retirement planning that is economically 
important, and describes the survey data used in this. We outline our empirical approach, 
focusing on the hazard realized retirement in Section III. Section IV presents a 
multinomial approach to investigate other aspects of unretirement behaviors. Section V 
discusses expectations and realizations of employment after age 62. Finally, Section VI 
concludes and discusses future directions. 
2.2 Data 
        We rely primarily on the restricted access RAND version of the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) data set in this paper. The data set focuses on individuals over 
age 50 and their spouses, allowing us to focus on several retirement-related transitions. 
Also, the HRS survey asks questions about retirement-related expectations, providing a 
subjective measure of retirement expectations. In addition, the data contains 
comprehensive information regarding socio-economic and demographic variables, 
health status, financial and housing wealth, income, benefits, social security, pensions, 
and employment history. The HRS is an ongoing biennial longitudinal survey covering 
ten waves from 1991 through 2010. We use RAND and the restricted version of all the 
ten waves in the paper, containing five cohorts including the original HRS cohort (born 
in 1924), the Assets and Health Dynamics cohort (born in 1924 or earlier), the Children 
of Depression cohort (born between 1924 and 1930), the War Baby cohort (born 
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between 1942 and 1947), and the Early Baby Boomer cohort (born between 1948 and 
1953).  
        HRS asks several detailed employment questions that are consistent across waves. 
This allows us to construct rich dependent variables regarding the employment patterns 
of older workers. These include actual retirement, unretirement transitions (i.e. 
reentering the workforce after the first retirement decision.) actual working status, and 
early expectations of being employed after age 62.  
        We define retirement based on self-reported retirement status, including those who 
are completely retired and partly retired. Figure 2.1 plots the proportions of 
homeowners undergoing retirement transitions during the ages of 50s and 60s, revealing 
similar trends across genders. [Insert Figure 2.1 about here] The key tendencies in the 
data, most notably the spikes on retirement at 62/63, are quite similar for females and 
males. There is a monotonically increasing trend before the spikes other than the age 
65/66 bump decline after the spikes.  
        Although direct movement from working to eventual retirement is more probable, 
we see significant proportions either turned partly retired or reversing retirement. In this 
paper we construct several variables to reflect various elderly postretirement paths and 
define unretirement transactions based on these categories. Table 2.1 lists 
postretirement paths, along with the number of observations and the percentage share. 
[Insert Table 2.1 about here] These transitions are identified on the basis of wave-to-
wave changes in self-reported retirement status. We find that almost two thirds of our 
observations remain completely retired, while twelve percent remain partly retired. 
Observations following the modal retirement path, (such as from being not retired to 
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being partly retired / completely retired, and from being partly retired to being 
completely retired), account for another eleven percent. Unretirement path is defined as 
three specific transitions categorized in Table 2.1: completely retired to partly retired, 
completely retired to not retired, and partly retired to not retired. While somewhat 
unusual, unretirement transitions represent about 7.5 percent of our data.  
        In Figure 2.2.1, we use aggregate statistics of the data to demonstrate the 
relationship between actual retirement rate (around age 62) and expected retirement 
rates during different waves. [Insert Figure 2.2.1 about here] Two intuitive patterns 
emerge from Figure 2.2.1. First, actual retirement rates share similar trends with 
subjective expected retirement rates for most HRS waves, with the sole exception of the 
2009-2010 wave. Second, the retirement rates expected from the first survey lag wave 
are closer to the realized retirement rates than those from the third survey lag. This is 
consistent with the reasonable assumption that the accuracy of expectations gets 
stronger as respondents approach their actual retirement. Figure 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 
illustrate the trends for females and males respectively, displaying both similarities and 
differences across genders. Actual retirement rates correspond to subjective 
expectations for both women and men, except for the turbulent last wave 2009-2010. 
However, while the most recent expectations are strong predictors of actual retirement 
for females, they are surprisingly poor signals for males.  
        Housing wealth, financial wealth and property taxes are our major independent 
variables of interest. HRS asks questions about home ownership, self-assessed home 
value, mortgage liability, property tax liabilities, checking accounts, saving accounts, 
stocks, and other investments. Following Zhao and Burge (2015), we use the net value 
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of home equity to capture changes in accumulated housing wealth. Figure 3 displays the 
asset allocations of elderly homeowners in terms of these four variables. [Insert Figure 3 
about here] A prolonged housing boom since the late 1990s and the striking bust 
starting in 2007 surface in the figure. Financial wealth and property taxes also appear to 
share a similar trend, consistent with the overall housing market fluctuations. However, 
there is a potential validity issue associated with using the self-reported housing wealth 
since that value only reflects perceived price variations as opposed to actual market 
conditions. We acknowledge this particular concern and extend our data by merging 
MSA-specific home value indexes with the household survey data.  
        Our two alternative measures each carry certain advantages and disadvantages over 
the other. The HPIs are exogenous to households‟ individual shocks, but they show 
limited variation in housing wealth. Thus, this fails to fully reflect changes in housing 
wealth due to absent indebtedness and heterogeneity at the neighborhood level. Self-
reported measure is more direct in reflecting rich variation in housing wealth, but it has 
a common critique of present measurement error.  
        Table 2.2 lists all the variables relavant and data sources. [Insert Table 2.2 about 
here] Table 2.3 displays summary statistics for the 103,593 observations analyzed in our 
paper, along with subsample statistics for female homeowners and male homeowners. 
[Insert Table 2.3 about here] These observations are greater than those in later 
regressions either because of the estimation method (i.e. hazard model) or because 
certain models only focus on specific subgroups (i.e. respondents who reverse the 
retirement decision after the initial retirement or reported expectations associated with 
retirement).  
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        The 103,593 examined observations remain after creating several intuitive filters. 
Among the observations eliminated are:  
 Respondents who are younger than 44. The survey target must be 50 or older, 
but they may have a younger spouse. We drop observations younger than 44. 
This restriction reduced the sample by less than 1 percent. 
 Extremely wealthy and extremely poor households, since we think they 
systematically display different behaviors in the labor market. We acknowledge 
our models may fail to characterize this group. We drop cases where households 
reported large negative values (i.e., less than -50,000 for housing wealth or for 
financial wealth, accounting for less than 1 percent of the sample) and where 
they reported large positive values (i.e., greater than 1,000,000 for housing 
wealth or 2,000,000 for financial wealth, accounting for less than 1 percent as 
well). 
 Respondents that fail to report any of these financial assets as well as reporting 
omissions (i.e., the true values are not zero, but the respondent skipped the 
questions) or non-banking households (where households‟ true financial wealth 
cannot be fully reflected). This restriction causes 15% reduction of the sample. 
 Observations with self-reported property taxes that are unrealistically high (i.e., 
over ten percent of home value). 
2.3 Actual Retirement Decisions 
        Estimating a series of hazard models, we examine the effects of housing wealth, 
property taxes, and financial wealth on retirement transitions, controlling for various 
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demographic factors, education, local economic conditions and other important worker 
characteristics. 
        We model retirement decisions following a standard duration hazard specification. 
In our analysis, survival occurs if a respondent has not yet retired. The hazard model 
assumes the event of interest only occurs once, when the surveyed individual initially 
reports his/her status as retired. Since they have no pre-retirement measures, we exclude 
the individuals who were already retired at their initial appearance in the survey, 
accounting for about 17% of the sample. 
        During the housing boom, greater wealth accumulated through home equity should 
speed up the actual retirement decision, while the heavier burden of rising property 
taxes as a result of rising home equity should slow down retirement decisions through 
the current liquidity constraint.  
        We specify an individual‟s initial transition to retirement as a discrete time Cox 
proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972). Here the status of being retired includes both 
being partially retired and completely retired. We also explore using full retirement for 
later robustness checks. The retirement hazard function,    |   , gives the probability 
that respondent i retires in period t conditional on not having already retired: 
           |    
   |   
     |   
 
        We specify a proportional hazards model of retirement as 
           |          {  
  } 
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in which age in years, t is the relevant duration.       is the baseline hazard function 
common to all individuals at time t, and is estimated non-parametrically. The baseline 
hazard function cancels out once a proportion is formed by separate hazards in the same 
time period. Hence, we have: 
        
   |   
   |   
 
    
   
 
   
   
     
    
             where 
                                                                      
          +                +                     +                    +            
        The right hand side variables include logged values of self-reported housing wealth, 
property taxes, financial wealth, a health status indicator, the local unemployment rate, 
and local tax burden, demographic characteristics including gender, race, education, and 
marital status, and wave specific dummies. Note that the specification of the model 
allows for flexible age effects. We use a series of age group dummies, reflecting not 
only a pure age effect, but also capturing the effects of relevant retirement policies such 
as Social Security and Medicare. Again, we note that in the hazard model a positive 
(negative) coefficient implies that large and positive values of the factor lead to later 
(earlier) retirement. 
        One concern in estimating the hazard model with self-reported housing wealth is a 
potential endogeneity issue. This occurs since households endogenously choose both 
housing consumption and mortgage indebtedness. To mitigate this concern, we use 
aggregated MSA specific housing price change instead of personal wealth changes, to 
capture quasi-experimental variation in housing wealth. This approach has been used 
previously (e.g. Farnham and Sevak 2007; Lovenheim 2011, Lovenheim and Mumford 
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2013; Lovenheim and Reynolds 2013; Zhao and Burge 2015) and is useful in our data 
context covering nearly the entire housing boom-bust cycle. Thus, alternatively we have: 
                                                                     
          +                +                     +                    +            
        However, retirement is not a completely irreversible event like birth or death. Out 
of our analysis sample, about six percent of retirement lapses as some respondents 
reverse retirement following their retirement decisions. These occasions of unretirement 
transitions will be revisited in the next section. 
        Table 2.4 presents the results of our hazard model for elerly homeowners‟ 
retirement. [Insert Table 2.4 about here] We find evidence that individuals retire earlier 
if they experience significant gains in their home equity and financial assets. 
Conversely, the retirement decision is delayed if property taxes increase. The evidence 
remains robust across the two alternative measures of housing wealth. Also, consistent 
with prior studies of retirement, we find evidence that health is one of the strongest 
factors influencing retirement decision. Older homeowners retire earlier if their health 
detoriates. The results also suggest how local unemployment and tax burden would 
affect older homeowners‟ retirement behaviors. Homeowners are predicted to 
experience earlier retirement with higher unemployment rates and higer local tax 
burdens.
12
 Although demographics are not a main focus of our study, we do find that 
Black, Hispanic, and Asian workers all retire at older ages than Whites. More highly 
                                                          
12 Property taxes have been controlled for through the variable of self-reported tax liabilities. Net of 
property tax burdens, more variation in the local tax burden rate comes from higher income taxes, 
either reducing the purchasing power of earnings, or serving as a disincentive to work. 
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educated respondents and married individuals also retire later, and having children has 
the same effect. Females retire earlier than males. 
        Since effect of the gender variable was significant and many of the studies in the 
literature focus on reactions to changes in wealth explore the role of gender, we 
consider the possibility that males and females in our data may adjust retirement subject 
to different underlying behavioral models. Therefore, we report estimated results for 
males and femaes seperately in columns 3 to 6. Overall, reactions across genders to 
wealth shocks retain the same direction, and the magnitudes of effects are similar for 
both genders. By measuring housing wealth with self-reported data, we find that the 
coefficient among females is only slightly bigger than that among males. When using 
housing price index alternatively, the significantly negative coefficient estimate remains 
for females, nearly doubling in size while the estimate turns insignificant for males. The 
effects of changes in property taxes are also significant and similar, again with females 
slightly more influenced. Changes in financial wealth are found to influence males with 
a bigger magnitude of effect.  
        We also use an alternative measure of retirement with a narrower definition that 
excludes partial retirement from being retirement status. The results remain 
qualatatively similar. 
        We also use a difference-in-difference approach as a robustness check to identify 
the effect of housing wealth by comparing retirement behaviors of otherwise similar 
homeowners (treatment group) and renters (control group) during the period with 
dramatic movement of home prices. This quasi-experimental analysis relies on our 
regional housing price index. Evidence is found to suggest significant housing wealth 
 70 
effects in the expected direction. From Column (1) of Table 2.5, our interaction term of 
interest shows elderly homeowners residing in the areas experiencing housing value 
appreciation are more likely to retire than otherwise similar renters. The estimated 
effects of interaction term are found to be positive as well, but not significant when 
splitting the sample to females and males respectively. 
2.4 Unretirement Transition 
        Here we focus on the non-traditional outcome of unretirement, investigating 
whether or not it is influenced by housing wealth and property taxes. Nearly six percent 
of retirees reversed their retirement decisions and went back to work. There are two 
possibilities when we try to explain the phenomenon of retirement. If the decision of 
being unretired is planned, that means the respondents perceived their future 
unretirement prior to their being retired. In this case, no factors during the 
postretirement period could contribute to an explanation of this untraditional retirement 
path. However, if the transition is not anticipated, that implies retirement reversal is 
driven by unexpected shocks to the various conditions affecting the household. 
        Modifying Maestas (2010) with some modifications relevant to our case, we use a 
multinomial logit specification to estimate unretirement. It is difficult for one to fully 
predict the evolution of his/her housing wealth, future property tax burdens and 
financial assets during our study period. The last two decades witnessed a volatile 
housing market and frequent macroeconomic fluctuations, causing a tremendous 
amount of uncertainty in terms of housing prices and housing wealth accumulation. 
        Also, it is unlikely that individuals accurately forecast all of the relevant changes in 
their health. As such, we assume unretirement transitions are primarily unanticipated, 
 71 
and that postretirement information of respondents‟ changes in health, wealth, local 
economic conditions and individual characteristics may influence the likelihood of 
making this transition.  
        The multinomial logit model in our analysis describes as 
         (        |        =
   
  
 
         
∑    
  
 
          
   
 
where r denotes the individual i‟s retirement date, and r+t denote the survey wave after 
retirement. The multinomial logit model over the choices after the initial retirement 
decision is defined by complete retirement, partial retirement and unretirement. Thus, k 
ranges from 1 to 3.  
        The benchmark specification is  
                                                                     
          +                +                     +                    +            
        The benchmark regression results reported in Table 2.6 use HRS self-reported 
measures of housing wealth. [Insert Table 2.6 about here] The probabilities of choosing 
partial retirement or being not retired are stated relative to the baseline category of full 
retirement. If unretirement arises because of negative wealth shocks, higher levels of 
housing wealth and financial wealth should decrease the probability of unretirement. 
Columns (1) and (2) report the results for regressions including both genders. The 
estimated coefficients for housing wealth are -0.02481 and -0.05277 respectively for 
partial retirement and unretirement, suggesting higher housing wealth is associated with 
greater likelihood of experiencing both partial retirement and unretirement, and the 
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negative effect appears stronger on unretirement than that on partial retirement. We also 
see the significant negative effect of financial assets, with coefficient estimates of -
0.05491 and -0.09899 on partial retirement and unretirement, somewhat bigger than the 
coefficients on housing wealth. Touching briefly on the other explanatory variables in 
our multinomial models, we find evidence that:  
 Better health status is a strong factor that increases the likelihood of reversing 
their previous retirement.  
 Elderly workers facing higher local tax burdens are more likely to turn unretired.  
 Facing worsening local employment conditions, elderly individuals are more 
likely to reverse their initial retirement decision.  
 Aging brings decreasingly likelihoods of transiting from retired to unretired.  
 Married individuals are less likely to transit to unretired, while having children 
make retirement reversal more likely.  
 Black workers are more likely to transit from full retirement to partial retirement 
or being unretired than white workers. Hispanic status only increases the 
likelihood of being partly retired. 
 More highly educated individuals are more likely to turn partially retired, but 
education is not found to influence the transition of being not retired. 
        Columns 3 through 6 report the results from multinomial models run separately for 
males and females. Careful examination of the coefficient estimates reveals 
qualitatively similar effects for most cases. The slightly bigger magnitudes for some 
coefficient estimates in the last two columns suggest male workers may be more 
responsive to property taxes, aging and health status.  
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2.5 Expectations and Realizations of Postponing Retirement at Age 62 
        From the analysis discussed in the previous section, it is difficult to identify 
whether adjustments regarding retirement status is anticipated or unanticipated by 
respondents. In the following analysis, we take advantage of the unique subjective 
measure of expectations regarding retirement in the HRS to investigate two 
mainquestions regarding expectations. First, we explore how housing wealth shocks 
impact expectations of postponing retirement beyond the modal retirement age. Second, 
we consider the relationship between expectations and realizations regarding retirement. 
2.5.1 Longitudinal Analysis of Retirement Expectations 
        The underlying nature of the cross-sectional variation in housing wealth may well 
present an endogeneity issue. Specifically, elderly households may initially decide 
among their housing related options that form plans of supplying specific amounts of 
future labor. This leads a situation where cross-sectional correlation between the two 
suffers from reverse causality bias. We use first differenced measures to mitigate 
potential bias associated with this concern. Thus, expectations regarding retirement 
decisions are modeled as:  
                                                                                      
           +        +                      +                     +            
        The dependent variable               indicates updating self-reported probability of 
working full-time after age 62, and all the explanatory variables are all first differenced.  
        Table 2.8.1 reports the results of the above first difference model and the original 
OLS results with two alternative measures of housing wealth. [Insert Table 2.8.1 about 
here] The coeffcient estimates in both models provide evidence that financial wealth, 
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health, and age are the only major factors explaining elderly homeowners‟ updating 
expectations of postponing retirement beyond the age of 62. Table 2.8.2 displays the 
first difference model results across gender groups. Although none of the relationships 
show statistically significant differences (i.e., as tested through insignificant gender 
interactions), there is some weak evidence suggesting female retirement expectations 
may be influenced by changes in financial wealth more intensively than males.  
2.5.2 Expectations regarding Retirement and Realizations 
        Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the HRS data in terms of our application is 
that we can precisely identify households whose retirement expectations and actual 
realizations differ. The interesting research question is what factors are correlated with 
these differences. Specifically, we estimate a model explaining retirement status after 
age 62 that includes the individuals‟ previous expectation over this outcome, along with 
all our other variables. Hence, we have: 
                                       
        Unsurprisingly, a comparison of estimation results that use expectations at 
different waves reveals the superiority of selecting the most recent expectations. Table 8 
presents the results of estimating equation (10) with these alternative expectations of 
respondents at different points in time. [Insert Table 2.9 about here] Panels A, B, and C 
report the results using retirement expectations from one wave ago, two waves ago, and 
three waves ago respectively. As anticipated, the pattern emerging from the results 
supports the idea that the accuracy of the anticipations is stronger when expectations are 
made at waves closer to the actual behavior.  
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        Table 2.10 displays the estimation results associated with actual employment 
around age 62. [Insert Table 2.10 about here] Three panels of results for both genders, 
females and males are reported. The first column in each panel excludes the variable of 
the most recent expectations regarding employment status after age 62. From the first 
column of panel (1), we find that older households‟ employment decisions around 62 
are impacted by all the wealth shocks, including housing wealth, property taxes and 
financial wealth. In response to a doubling of housing wealth, participation for older 
respondents drops by 1.3 percentage points. The coefficients on the property taxes and 
financial wealth are also significant and positive as we expected. The second column 
includes the variable of respondents‟ most recent expectation. The coefficient for 
financial wealth turns insignificant with an almost zero magnitude while housing wealth 
and property taxes stay robust. The pattern is consistent with the findings from Section 
IV: only financial wealth out of three interest variables impacts expectations. Here we 
find financial wealth influences employment near the retirement age through the 
mechanism of individual anticipations, while housing wealth and property taxes mainly 
impact unexpected decisions regarding employment choices at the modal retirement age. 
One of the possible explanations could be that older households do not fully take 
housing wealth into account until it is urgent to make the employment decision (or 
postpone the retirement). The failure to find evidence for housing wealth effect upon 
expectations could be due to the data limitation: we can only explore wave-to-wave 
changes. Also, we find females more commonly work beyond retirement date than 
males. Panels (2) and (3) display results for females and males respectively. The pattern 
of effects remains similar for females, while no evidence of a wealth effect is found for 
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males when controlling for the most recent expectations. Overall, all these results 
indicate that the expectations variable is a meaningful predictor of the subsequent 
decision of continuing to work after age 62, and housing wealth and property taxes only 
impact unexpected employment outcome around 62 in the context of our data.  
2.6 Conclusion 
       Recent decades witnessed unprecedented volatility in the housing market. As such, 
older households experienced dramatic fluctuations in their accumulated wealth in 
home equity. In this paper, we use restricted version HRS data spanning this time period 
to explore how housing wealth and property tax liabilities influence employment paths 
near the modal retirement age. The retirement-related behaviors we examine include 
actual decisions of both retirement and unretirement, as well as expectations of 
employment near the retirement age. In addition, two alternative measures of housing 
wealth - self-reported values and housing price indexes are used, since each carries 
certain advantages and disadvantages over one another.   
        The empirical results are both intuitive and robust. We find that housing wealth 
and property taxes play an important role in explaining the employment patterns of 
older population in the final stages of their working lives, supportive to older 
homeowners‟ strategic response to losses and gains in housing wealth, property taxes 
and financial wealth during the boom/bust cycle. Overall, we find that elderly workers 
retire earlier when experiencing positive shocks in housing wealth and financial wealth, 
whereas they postpone retirement due to increased property taxes. We also find 
unretirement is an alternative when older households experience wealth losses. Also, we 
find financial shocks, together with changes in health, helps explain longitudinal 
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variation in retirement expectations prior to the actual retirement, and serves as major 
mechanisms through which expectations affect retirement behaviors. Lastly, changes in 
retirement decisions are driven by housing wealth shocks and property taxes, but not 
financial wealth. 
        We follow traditional approaches by defining retirement status according to 
respondents‟ self-classification of “retired”, “partly retired”, or “not retired”. Future 
work should strive to examine more objective measures of retirement status. The 
objective definition could supplement these subjective measures with working hour 
requirements for three categories of retirement status. Comparisons with the present 
results could then test whether or not there are disparities between the self-reported and 
objective retirement classification, and whether the major findings remain robust to the 
choice of definitions. In addition, prior studies (Ruhm 1990) show that partial 
retirement almost always involves a change of employment sector, and that women 
maintain attachment to their prior industry more often. These and many other 
interesting questions relating to labor supply among older workers remain to be 
answered.  
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Table 2.1: Postretirement Paths. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defined as unretirement Obs. Percent
1. Completely  retired —> completely retired 21,775 64.41%
2. Completely  retired —> partly retired √ 1,257 3.72%
3. Completely  retired —> not retired √ 310 0.92%
4. Partly  retired —> completely retired 2,237 6.62%
5. Partly  retired —> partly retired 4,106 12.15%
6. Partly  retired —> not retired √ 959 2.84%
7. Not  retired —> completely retired 583 1.72%
8. Not  retired —> partly retired 1,087 3.22%
9. Not  retired —> not retired 1,493 4.42%
Total 33,807
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Table 2.2: Description of Variables. 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description Data source
Retirement-related:
  Retired Dummy equals one if the respondent is currently retired (either completely or 
partly).
RAND HRS
  Postretirement type Categorical variable that equals one if being completely retired, one if partly 
retired, and three if not retired.
RAND HRS
  Unretired Dummy equals one if the respondent does an unretirement transition, which 
include three possibilities: 1) completely retired to partly retired; 2) completely 
retired to not retired; 3) partly retired to not retired.
RAND HRS
Regarding the work status age 62
  Actual work status Dummy equals one if the respondent is currently working at age 62. RAND HRS
  Updating expectations Updating self-reported probability of working full-time after age 62. RAND HRS
    Expectations one wave ago Probability of working full-time after age 62 reported one wave ago. RAND HRS
    Expectations two waves ago Probability of working full-time after age 62 reported two waves ago. RAND HRS
    Expectations three waves ago Probability of working full-time after age 62 reported three waves ago. RAND HRS
Wealth-related:
Home assets The total value of the primary residence. RAND HRS
Housing wealth The value of the primary residence less mortgages and home loan. RAND HRS
Property tax Self-reported property tax liabilities paid last year. HRS
Financial assets Sum of stocks, mutual funds, investment trusts, checking, savings, money market 
accounts, government saving bonds, other bonds and all other savings.
RAND HRS
Financial wealth Net value of non-housing financial wealth, calculated by substracting non-
mortgage debts  from the sum of stocks, mutual funds, investment trusts, 
checking, savings, money market accounts, government saving bonds, other 
bonds and all other savings. 
RAND HRS
Demographics:
Cohort Five cohort dummies: HRS, AHEAD, CODA, WB and EBB. RAND HRS
Age Age in years. RAND HRS
Squared age Squared value of age.
Health Categorical variable that equals five if self-report health is poor, four if fair, three 
if good, four if very good, and five if excellent.
RAND HRS
Female Dummy equals one if the respondent is female. RAND HRS
Number of children Number of children within the household. RAND HRS
Married Dummy equals one if the respondent is married. RAND HRS
Race Four race dummies of white, black, hispanic and other racial group. RAND HRS
Education years Number of years that the respondent spent in school. RAND HRS
Education degree Four education degree dummies of no degree, high school, college and above, and 
other degree.
RAND HRS
Location & wave:
Wave Ten wave dummies 1991 through 2010. RAND HRS
Housing price index MSA specific housing price index Federal Housing 
Finance Agency
Local tax burden rate State specific local tax burden rate. Tax Foundation
Unemployment rate MSA specific unemployment rate aggregated from counties. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics of Observations in the Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Obs. Mean Std. Obs. Mean Std.
Retirement-related:
      Retired 82,356 0.5867 0.4924 43,254 0.5506 0.4974 39,102 0.6267 0.4837
      Postretirement type 48,951 1.3630 0.6283 24,412 1.3717 0.6535 24,539 1.3524 0.6021
      Unretired 33,807 0.0748 0.2629 16,280 0.0746 0.2628 17,527 0.0748 0.2631
Regarding the work status at age 62
      Actual work status 6,704 0.3371 0.4728 3,632 0.3283 0.4697 3,073 0.3475 0.4763
      Retirement expectations (in%) 30,715 46.08 38.82 17,473 41.63 37.99 13,242 51.96 39.13
         Expectations one wave ago (in%) 26,997 45.62 38.80 15,378 41.43 37.95 11,619 51.16 39.22
         Expectations two waves ago (in%) 22,859 45.09 38.76 12,976 40.76 37.86 9,883 50.78 39.20
         Expectations three waves ago (in%) 18,945 45.62 38.96 10,694 41.36 38.03 8,251 51.14 39.45
Wealth-related:
     Home assets 103,593 167,619 156,257 57,216 163,918 154,152 46,377 172,185.7 158,699
     Housing wealth 103,593 135,872 135,139 57,216 133,799 133,830 46,377 138,114.8 137,045
   △log(Housing wealth) 83,045 0.2992 2.1349 46,100 0.3057 2.1411 36,945 0.2911 2.1271
     Property tax 103.593 1,700.78 1,810.06 57,216 1,659.99 188.15 46,377 1,751.102 1,820.98
   △log(property tax) 75,781 0.1734 1.4507 41.869 0.1753 1.4584 33,912 0.1709 1.4411
     Financial assets 103,593 115,769 221,919 57,216 111,308.9 216,990 46,377 121,271.4 227,735
   △log(Financial assets) 78,863 0.0847 1.6635 43,663 0.0808 1.6966 35,200 0.0897 1.6216
Demographics:
Age (in years) 103,593 65.827 10.15 57,216 65.29 10.51 46,377 66.49 9.66
Health (in a 5-point scale) 103,593 3.3491 1.0909 57,216 3.3775 1.0821 46,377 3.3139 1.1008
Female 103,593 0.5523 0.4973
Number of children 103,593 3.1075 1.9826 57,216 3.0829 1.9780 46,377 3.1378 1.9877
Married 103,593 0.7750 0.4176 57,216 0.6940 0.4608 46,377 0.8750 0.3307
Race dummies
     White 103,593 0.8533 0.3538 57,216 0.8475 0.3595 46,377 0.8606 0.3464
     Black 103,593 0.0811 0.2730 57,216 0.0863 0.2807 46,377 0.0747 0.2629
     Hispanic 103,593 0.0485 0.2148 57,216 0.0493 0.2164 46,377 0.0475 0.2127
     Other race 103,593 0.0171 0.1296 57,216 0.0170 0.1292 46,377 0.0172 0.1300
Education (in years) 103,315 12.7792 2.8276 57,100 12.7161 2.6185 46,215 12.8572 3.0646
Education degree dummies
      No degree 103,593 0.1771 0.3818 57,216 0.1666 0.3726 46,377 0.1901 0.3924
      High school 103,593 0.6039 0.4891 57,216 0.6500 0.4770 46,377 0.5471 0.4978
      College & above 103,593 0.2179 0.4128 57,216 0.1829 0.3866 46,377 0.2609 0.4392
      Other degree 103,593 0.0011 0.0302 57,216 0.0005 0.0229 46,377 0.0018 0.0425
Year 103,593 2000.86 5.5349 57,216 2000.9 5.5217 46,377 2000.76 5.5496
MSA level housing price index growth (in%) 98,267 3.7997 6.5218 54,308 3.7910 6.5659 43,959 3.8104 6.4670
MSA level unemployment rate (in%) 103,342 5.8720 2.3756 57,082 5.8693 2.3733 46,260 5.8753 2.3784
State level local tax burden (in%) 103,354 9.5789 1.1747 57,089 9.5737 1.1714 46,265 9.5853 1.1787
Homeowners Female Homeowners Male Homeowners
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Table 2.4: Hazard Model of Retirement. 
 
Note: Housing wealth, property taxes, and financial assets are naturally logged. Covariates not shown in 
this table also include wave dummies. 
 
 
Housing wealth -0.03288*** -0.03383*** -0.03009***
(0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0063)
Hpi_growth -0.00218* -0.00415*** 0.00013
(0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0017)
Property tax 0.03505*** 0.02748*** 0.03753*** 0.03018*** 0.02903*** 0.02124***
(0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0055) (0.0053)
Financial wealth -0.06026*** -0.06465*** -0.05459*** -0.05887*** -0.07187*** -0.07623***
(0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0043) (0.0042)
Health 0.12693*** 0.12627*** 0.12174*** 0.12182*** 0.13376*** 0.13265***
(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0077)
Unemployment rate -0.01690*** -0.01725*** -0.01932*** -0.02085*** -0.01430*** -0.01312***
(0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0051)
Local tax burden -0.01218** -0.01587*** -0.02229*** -0.02516*** -0.00413 -0.00860
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0074)
N of children 0.02205*** 0.02066*** 0.02809*** 0.02666*** 0.01564*** 0.01415***
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0040)
Married 0.60207*** 0.59395*** 0.67529*** 0.66561*** 0.42242*** 0.41775***
(0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0228) (0.0228)
Female -0.03109*** -0.03476***
(0.0118) (0.0119)
Hispanic 0.12021*** 0.11277*** 0.07972* 0.07130* 0.16912*** 0.16280***
(0.0296) (0.0298) (0.0414) (0.0417) (0.0424) (0.0426)
Black 0.28158*** 0.28721*** 0.32573*** 0.32802*** 0.21122*** 0.22025***
(0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0281) (0.0282) (0.0328) (0.0328)
Other race 0.19626*** 0.19479*** 0.36078*** 0.35875*** 0.03071 0.02967
0.0471 0.0473 (0.0655) (0.0659) (0.0679) (0.0681)
High school 0.44111*** 0.43946*** 0.41551*** 0.41310*** 0.48208*** 0.48184***
(0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0225) (0.0227) (0.0223) (0.0224)
College 0.57570*** 0.57112*** 0.69187*** 0.69200*** 0.49825*** 0.49101***
0.0195 0.0196 (0.0282) (0.0284) (0.0271) (0.0273)
Other degree 0.07320 0.07541 0.28129 0.29909 0.08025 0.08144
(0.1697) (0.1697) (0.7085) (0.7086) (0.1752) (0.1753)
N of obs 85060 80758 48968 46480 36092 34278
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level. 
Variable
Homeowners The male homeownersThe female homeowners
(1) (2) (3)
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Table 2.5: Difference-in-Difference Estimation of Housing Price Index Growth Effect. 
 
Note: Housing wealth, property taxes, and financial assets are naturally logged. Covariates not shown in 
this table also include wave dummies and a set of age group dummies. 
 
Both Genders Females Males
(1) (2) (3) 
Hpi_growth -0.00173*** -0.00177*** -0.00154**
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Homeowner 0.06729*** 0.04105*** 0.10258***
(0.0069) (0.0092) (0.0104)
Hpi_growth*homeowner 0.00097** 0.00086 0.00082
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Property tax -0.00926*** -0.00707*** -0.01171***
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0013)
Financial wealth -0.00821*** 0.00907*** 0.00619***
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Health -0.04671*** -0.04676*** -0.04609***
(0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0017)
Unemployment rate 0.00206*** 0.00228** 0.00131
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Local tax burden 0.00023 -0.00362** 0.00476***
(0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Female 0.00967***
(0.0025)
Number of children 0.00056 0.00117 -0.00020
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Married 0.03171*** 0.04594*** -0.00319
(0.0030) (0.0039) (0.0049)
Hispanic -0.05555*** -0.06005*** -0.05054***
(0.0056) (0.0077) (0.0082)
Black 0.00622 0.00315 0.00990
(0.0041) (0.0054) (0.0064)
Otherrace -0.04340*** -0.03996*** -0.04676***
(0.0085) (0.0116) (0.0124)
High school -0.00713** -0.01900*** 0.01063**
(0.0035) (0.0049) (0.0050)
College -0.03543*** -0.02141*** -0.04103***
(0.0043) (0.0062) (0.0060)
Other degree 0.05122 0.14226* 0.01632
(0.0423) (0.0828) (0.0488)
R^2 0.4338 0.4396 0.1663
N 95,656 51,776 47,008
Variable
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 2.6: Multinomial Model of Unretirement. 
 
Note: Housing wealth, property taxes, and financial assets are naturally logged. Covariates not shown in 
this table also include wave dummies. 
 
partly retired not retired partly retired not retired partly retired not retired
Housing wealth -0.02481*** -0.05277*** -0.02527* -0.05075*** -0.02683** -0.05488***
(0.0091) (0.0118) (0.0134) (0.0161) (0.0124) (0.0175)
Property tax 0.05690*** 0.07246*** 0.04907*** 0.05411*** 0.06468*** 0.09551***
(0.0086) (0.0131) (0.0124) (0.0170) (0.0120) (0.0206)
Financial wealth -0.05491*** -0.09899*** -0.06480*** -0.10002*** -0.04265*** -0.09551***
(0.0063) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0118) (0.0087) (0.0139)
Health 0.30931*** 0.37742*** 0.30824*** 0.34426*** 0.31490*** 0.42264***
(0.0120) (0.0177) (0.0180) (0.0236) (0.0162) (0.0271)
Unemployment rate
-0.02123*** -0.01619 -0.03312*** -0.03108** -0.0117 -0.00056
(0.0072) (0.0106) (0.0110) (0.0147) (0.0093) (0.0155)
Local tax burden -0.06331*** -0.07366*** -0.00903 -0.01254 -0.10699*** -0.14547***
(0.0111) (0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0219) (0.0151) (0.0252)
Age -0.06494*** -0.29675*** -0.05519* -0.24079*** -0.06070** -0.36756***
(0.0210) (0.0304) (0.0302) (0.0398) (0.0307) (0.0490)
Age^2 -0.00009 0.00123*** -0.00022 0.00079*** -0.00009 0.00176***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004)
N of children 0.02592*** 0.03310*** 0.03466*** 0.02563** -0.01561* 0.04059***
(0.0061) (0.0091) (0.0089) (0.0121) (0.0084) (0.0137)
Married -0.06908** -0.10801** -0.16589*** -0.19183*** 0.06558 0.02162
(0.0316) (0.0466) (0.0414) (0.0574) (0.0513) (0.0844)
Female -0.35677*** 0.08763**
(0.0252) (0.0371)
Hispanic -0.21418*** 0.02761 -0.09620 -0.02668 -0.30153*** 0.11105
(0.0688) (0.0912) (0.1023) (0.1278) (0.0931) (0.1309)
Black 0.15916*** 0.09350*** 0.30185*** -0.02443 0.00820 0.26369***
(0.0436) (0.0625) (0.0598) (0.0843) (0.0645) (0.0940)
Other race 0.12554 0.35927*** 0.2396* 0.35355** 0.01473 0.32687
(0.0983) (0.1304) (0.1413) (0.1735) (0.1370) (0.1992)
High school 0.12911*** -0.05692 0.22297*** -0.04955 0.04146 -0.05658
(0.0364) (0.0524) (0.0561) (0.0698) (0.0483) (0.0806)
College 0.31618*** 0.10268 0.22436*** -0.04538 0.33443*** 0.25962***
(0.0432) (0.0639) (0.0687) (0.0885) (0.0562) (0.0946)
Other degree 0.64356 1.53861*** 1.0740 1.79017 0.59051 1.49360***
(0.3921) (0.4029) (1.2340) (1.1081) (0.4207) (0.0946)
N of obs 48857 48857 24366 24366 24491 24491
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level. 
Variable
Homeowners The female homeowners The male homeowners
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Table 2.7: Estimating the Transition of Unretirement. 
 
Note: Housing wealth, property taxes, and financial assets are naturally logged. Covariates not shown in 
this table also include wave dummies. 
(1) (2) (3)
Homeowners Female Homeowners Male Homeowners
Housing wealth -0.00278** -0.00369** -0.00197
(0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Property tax 0.00215** 0.00252* 0.00175
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Financial wealth -0.00432*** -0.00436*** -0.00416***
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Health 0.01483*** 0.01561*** 0.01414***
(0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0019)
Unemployment rate -0.00047 -0.00094 -0.00002
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Local tax burden -0.00391*** -0.00318* -0.00461**
(0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Age -0.0201*** -0.01937*** -0.02099***
(0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0034)
Age^2 0.0001*** 0.00011*** 0.00012***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Female -0.01005***
(0.0030)
Married -0.00639* -0.01343*** 0.00376
(0.0036) (0.0046) (0.0058)
N of children 0.00210*** 0.00283*** 0.00139
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Hispanic 0.00569 0.00545 0.00605
(0.0079) (0.0118) (0.0107)
Black 0.01746*** 0.01419** 0.02053***
(0.0053) (0.0072) (0.0078)
Other race 0.01611 0.01008 0.02160
(0.0119) (0.0171) (0.01667)
High school -0.00243 0.00055 -0.00503
(0.0041) (0.0061) (0.0056)
College -0.00285 -0.00006 -0.00549
(0.0050) (0.0076) (0.0067)
Other degree 0.04810 0.06864 0.0422
(0.0501) (0.1297) (0.0546)
R^2 0.0268 0.0319 0.0234
N of obs 33759 16254 17505
Variable
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 2.8.1: Expectations of Postponing Retirement. 
 
Note: Housing wealth, property taxes, and financial assets are naturally logged. Covariates not shown in 
this table also include wave dummies. 
Housing wealth -0.80464*** 0.04939
(0.1315) (0.1318)
hpi growth -0.02136 -0.04012
(0.0517) (0.0599)
Property tax 0.95425*** 0.68184*** -0.24873 -0.22619
(0.1781) (0.1782) (0.2150) (0.1853)
Financial wealth -2.18506*** -2.31289*** -0.33011** -0.34143**
(0.1184) (0.1203) (0.1603) (0.1629)
Health 3.5514*** 3.41195*** 0.89818*** 0.97542***
(0.2314) (0.2413) (0.3230) (0.3306)
Unemployment rate 0.04910 0.05671 -0.47430 -0.47054
(0.1170) (0.1272) (0.2999) (0.3139)
Local tax burden -0.93591*** -0.99407*** 0.15606 0.00130
(0.1998) (0.2097) (0.8807) (0.8986)
Age -7.92000*** -7.93318*** -3.38483* -3.8164**
(1.1400) (1.1860) (1.7383) (1.7815)
Age^2 0.07971*** 0.07959*** 0.03328** 0.03729**
(0.0204) (0.0108) (0.0157) (0.01607)
Female -10.3858*** -10.54614***
(0.4516) (0.4695)
Married -8.18838*** -7.95792***
(0.6231) (0.6426)
N of children 0.24526** 0.27024**
(0.1242) (0.1299)
Hispanic -0.91699 -0.96996
(0.9821) (1.0118)
Black -7.35771*** -7.23218***
(0.7790) (0.7985)
Other race 1.96668 2.23689
(1.4787) (1.5046)
High school 2.86513*** 2.65464***
(0.7775) (0.8304)
College 8.16386*** 8.18244***
(0.8854) (0.9362)
Other degree 1.61111 1.80336
(8.4251) (8.4397)
R^2 0.0676 0.0659 0.0065 0.0069
N of obs 30657 28353 17614 16799
Variable
1st DiffOLS
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level.
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Table 2.8.2: Expectations of Postponing Retirement (First Difference Model) 
 
Note: Housing wealth, property taxes, and financial assets are naturally logged. Covariates not shown in 
this table also include wave dummies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First Difference First Difference First Difference
Homeowners Female Homeowners Male Homeowners
Housing wealth 0.04939 0.03244 0.08866
(0.1318) (0.1766) (0.1980)
Property tax -0.24873 -0.25840 -0.23275
(0.2150) (0.2861) (0.3264)
Financial wealth -0.33011** -0.37432* -0.26745
(0.1603) (0.2101) (0.2481)
Health 0.89818*** 0.80827* 0.98884**
(0.3230) (0.4381) (0.4780)
Unemployment rate -0.47430 -0.65758 -0.22002
(0.2999) (0.4033) (0.4485)
Local tax burden 0.15606 0.11128 0.19529
(0.8807) (1.2118) (1.2808)
Age -3.38483* -1.90106 -4.08527
(1.7383) (2.0916) (3.6836)
Age^2 0.03328** 0.01973 0.04060
(0.0157) (0.0190) (0.0326)
R^2 0.0065 0.0059 0.0093
N of obs 17614 10143 7471
Variable
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 2.9: Expectations of Postponing Retirement. 
 
Note: Housing wealth, property taxes, and financial assets are naturally logged. Covariates not shown in 
this table also include wave dummies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (3) (3)
Homeowners Female Homeowners Male Homeowners
Coefficient on the Expectation o.56925*** 0.53124*** 0.60496***
(0.0164) (0.0237) (0.0228)
R-squared 0.2600 0.2475 0.2871
N 4226 2137 2089
Coefficient on the Expectation 0.49760*** 0.47843*** 0.50891***
(0.0195) (0.0280) (0.0276)
R-squared 0.1869 0.1853 0.2005
N 3769 1937 1832
Coefficient on the Expectation 0.45839*** 0.40747*** 0.50124***
(0.0214) (0.0311) (0.0296)
R-squared 0.1670 0.1447 0.2070
N 3278 1698 1580
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level. 
A. Using the most recent expectation.
B. Using 1 wave before the most recent expectation.
C. Using 2 waves before the most recent expectation.
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Table 2.10: Estimating Full-time Employment after Age 62 Using Expectations. 
 
Note: Housing wealth, property taxes, and financial assets are naturally logged. Covariates not shown in 
this table also include wave dummies. 
 
 
The most recent expectation 0.56924*** 0.53125*** 0.60496***
(0.0164) (0.0237) (0.0228)
Housing wealth -0.01314*** -0.00942** -0.01951*** -0.01543** -0.00814 -0.00415
(0.0037) (0.0071) (0.0053) (0.0063) (0.0053) (0.0058)
Property tax 0.02273*** 0.01565*** 0.02145*** 0.02243*** 0.02444*** 0.00798
(0.0040) (0.0050) (0.0054) (0.0067) (0.0061) (0.0074)
Financial wealth -0.01292*** -0.00041 -0.01446*** -0.00227 -0.00892* 0.00123
(0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0052) (0.0046) (0.0054)
Health 0.06640*** 0.02572*** 0.07428*** 0.04312*** 0.05861*** 0.00826
(0.0058) (0.0071) (0.0078) (0.0102) (0.0085) (0.0099)
Unemployment rate -0.00707** -0.00534 -0.00642 -0.00536 -0.00766 -0.00569
(0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0045) (0.0059) (0.0048) (0.0054)
Local tax burden -0.00173 0.00338 -0.00468 -0.00124 0.00111 0.00806
0.0052 (0.0062) (0.0070) (0.0089) (0.0078) (0.0085)
Age -3.93379*** -6.3871*** -2.26924 -5.8229*** -6.3023*** -6.68274***
(1.1948) (1.4108) (1.6199) (2.0001) (1.7745) (2.0008)
Age^2 0.03116*** 0.05062*** 0.01785 0.04602*** 0.05011*** 0.05307***
(0.0096) (0.0113) (0.0130) (0.0160) (0.0142) (0.01603)
Female -0.02982*** 0.07361***
(0.0116) (0.0139)
Married -0.10835*** -0.02725 -0.14099*** -0.03950* -0.03015 -0.01141
(0.0154) (0.0178) (0.0185) 0.0223 (0.0284) (0.0309)
N of children -0.00065 -0.00540 -0.00420 -0.01123** 0.00182 -0.00030
(0.0030) (0.0036) (0.0041) 0.0053 (0.0045) (0.0050)
Hispanic 0.05588** 0.03136 0.02008 -0.02129 0.10518*** 0.09608**
(0.0269) (0.0335) (0.0360) 0.0473 (0.0407) (0.0477)
Black -0.00730 -0.00129 -0.02272 -0.02900 0.01918 0.04153
(0.0206) (0.0244) (0.0275) 0.0336 (0.0312) (0.0358)
Otherrace 0.03103 0.33111 -0.00299 -0.06529 0.07064 0.13656*
(0.0441) (0.2174) (0.0590) (0.0750) (0.0666) (0.0700)
High school 0.03263* -0.04023* 0.01976 -0.09540*** 0.04439* 0.00888
(0.0172) (0.0222) (0.0234) (0.0324) (0.0255) (0.0305)
College 0.10416*** -0.00939 0.03872 -0.11237*** 0.15906*** 0.08026**
(0.0212) (0.0259) (0.0297) (0.0383) (0.0307) (0.0353)
Otherdegree -0.22381 -0.33111 -0.38973* -0.42299*** -0.12590 -0.30196
(0.1468) (0.2174) (0.2307) (0.3126) (0.1917) (0.3043)
R^2 0.0547 0.2600 0.0624 0.2475 0.0585 0.2871
N of obs. 6695 4226 3623 2137 3072 2089
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level. 
Variable
(1)
Homeowners Female Homeowners
(2) (3)
Male Homeowners
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Figure 2.1: Proportion of Retirement Transitions. 
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Figure 2.2.1: Actual vs. Expected Retirement Rates 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2.2: Actual vs. Expected Retirement Rates (Females) 
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Figure 2.2.3: Actual vs. Expected Retirement Rates (Males) 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Assets Allocation of Elderly Households within Our Analysis 1991-2010. 
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Chapter 3: Trends in Reverse Mortgages during the Recent Boom-
Bust Housing Cycle 
3.1 Introduction 
        In the United States, the federal reverse mortgage program allows elderly 
homeowners aged at 62 or older to withdraw some or all of the equity they have 
accumulated in their homes at younger ages. The purpose is to enhance current levels of 
consumption. By waiving their rights to future resources that pay out when the property 
is eventually sold, older homeowners are able to supplement their current consumption. 
Conceptually then, the decision operates much like an annuity, but is „purchased‟ using 
wealth stored in the form of housing equity rather than cash. 
        The Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) is a specific type of reverse 
mortgage that is insured by the federal government.  As such, homeowners have 
traditionally viewed it as a safe plan that can provide greater financial security. To be 
eligible for a HECM, the individual must be 62 or older. Also, they must own their 
home with no outstanding mortgage, or must be able to pay off the entire existing 
mortgage through the reverse mortgage they will qualify for. As such, the program is 
designed for, and actively markets itself towards, “house-rich, cash-poor” residents by 
helping them finance their retirement. 
        Although the Federal legislation enabling the current program was passed in the 
late 1980s, the HECM program was scarcely utilized among elderly homeowners until 
the early 2000s. At that time, the market for reverse mortgages began to grow 
substantially and has rapidly accelerated since. [Insert Figure 3.1 about here] This 
 93 
makes it one of several major options based on home equity available to the retired 
including downsizing, migrating to low cost regions, home equity withdrawal, and 
simply leaving the homeownership. 
        Over the last two decades, the U.S. experienced a significant boom-bust cycle in 
the housing market. During this horizon there were several striking changes in the long 
run trends of the reverse mortgage landscape. First, there was an accelerated upward 
trend in originations of HECMs that coincided with the timing of large gains in house 
prices during the early to mid 2000s. Existing studies examine the demand side of 
reverse mortgages in the early years of the program that preceded this explosive growth. 
Case and Schnare (1994) evaluate the demand for reverse mortgages by considering the 
attributes of borrowers, their properties, and the types of payment options. 
Unsurprisingly, they find the strongest demand for reverse mortgages among “house-
rich, cash-poor” elderly homeowners. More recent work by Shan (2011) explored the 
reasons why the reverse mortgage market experienced substantial growth in the early 
and mid-2000s, attributing much of the growth in demand to higher housing prices 
rather than changes in other demographic factors. Specifically, she estimates that about 
one-third of all reverse mortgage originations during 2003-2007 can be attributed to 
house price growth. 
        However, there is another notable phenomenon that, surprisingly, has not been 
examined by these studies or the other relatively few papers that have taken up the topic 
of reverse mortgages: namely, the idea that a predictable gap (e.g., lag structure) exists 
between the co-movement of housing wealth shocks and HECM originations. Recall 
from Figure 3.1 that the peak number of HECM originations is observed in 2009. 
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Paradoxically then, one would have to explain why this peak value occurred two full 
years after the beginning of the housing market bust (which is generally accepted to be 
sometime in the late 2006 to early 2007 time frame, depending on regional factors). 
During the years 2007 to 2009, the housing market experienced turbulence and 
declining prices, yet the number of HECM loans still grew steadily. One of the main 
contributions of this paper is that we stress the importance of the idea that the structural 
characteristics of the Federal HECM program and the expectation of future housing 
prices played a large role in explaining why HECM origination became more attractive 
to homeowners during this period (i.e., 2007-2009) than it was in the mid 2000s, even 
though housing prices were already past their peak values.  
        To further illustrate this point, Figure 3.2 displays the comparison of growth rates 
between reverse mortgages and housing prices in the U.S., generated from the data that 
we eventually use to conduct the present analyses. [Insert Figure 3.2 about here] 
Importantly, the figure motivates a discussion of the Federal HECM program and 
empirical investigation of the effects of housing prices on reverse mortgage originations 
in a manner that allows for potentially asymmetric and lagged effects. 
        There are several possibilities that could be driving the lag structure between 
housing prices and reverse mortgage originations. We argue that one potential factor is 
the institutional mechanism of the reverse mortgage instrument itself, and the extent to 
which the timing and dollar level of HECM appraisals may differ from those generated 
for homes being sold through traditional mortgages. Another concern has to do with the 
“buyer” of the home. In the private market during the initial portions of the housing 
crisis, the average length of time on the market for homes grew considerably, as sellers 
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believed their homes were worth more than buyers did (Genesove and Han, 2012). 
However, the HECM transaction does not follow this market based approach. Rather, 
the “buyer” of a HECM was the government, making an immediate purchase each time 
a qualified home owner applied. This motivates empirical analysis examining the 
potentially asymmetric effect of housing prices on the reverse mortgage market.  
        In addition, the gender and marital composition of HECM borrowers has been 
changing persistently since the early 2000s. Figure 3.3 presents the fractions of each 
type of borrowers by gender and marital status. [Insert Figure 3.3 about here] Prior to 
2000 the composition of HECM users was quite stable, with single females playing a 
clearly dominant role. However, rapid gains in the number of originations from the 
other two categories, but most notably the massive increase in the frequency of married 
couples, led to a reversal of this dominance. By 2012 married couples took out nearly as 
many reverse mortgages as single females. Importantly, this striking narrowing of the 
gap was quite persistent even during and after the harshest portions of the housing 
market crisis. The increasingly important role played by single males and married 
couples may relate to modifications of traditional gender roles and specialization in 
home/work production. Additionally, Zhao and Burge (2015) find that female labor 
force participation is more responsive to housing wealth shocks than male labor supply. 
In this study, we further explore roles of gender and family composition in originating 
reverse mortgages. 
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        While a full description of the federal HEMC program lies beyond the scope of 
this essay, several important aspects of the program are worth highlighting.
13
 Policy 
changes to the terms of home value limits and maximum loan amounts made by HUD 
actually coincided with the bust period of housing market, and likely influenced the 
pronounced variation in the frequency and composition of HECMs. In 2006, the 
national loan limit of $417,000 was established. It was raised to $625,500 with a 
legislation being passed in 2009. These changes made HECM program more attractive 
and thus decreased proprietary loans at the same time the total number of originating 
reverse mortgage rose. Proprietary reverse mortgages are loans structured and backed 
by private companies, and designed for high value homes that are usually above the 
$600,000 level. Concurrent with raising the loan limit maximums, however, HUD made 
downward adjustments in the percentages of home value that could be borrowed. For 
example, in 2009 the percentage was adjusted from 62% to 56%. The policy changes of 
raising the loan value limit and lowering percentage limit allowed the HECM program 
to apply to more homeowners in need, because of a new wider range of targeted 
property values. [Insert Table 3.1 about here] Also, another new variation occurred to 
the HECM program at the same time. In 2009, the Federal Housing Administration 
introduced a new function of HECM allowing older Americans to buy a new home by 
putting a reverse mortgage on it, while it has been little used.  
        In this study, we seek to extend the current literature by examining factors that 
influenced changes in the landscape of the reverse mortgage market and consider 
potentially asymmetric effects of housing prices on this outcome. We will do so in two 
                                                          
13 For more detailed discussion of the institutional framework of the HECM program, interested readers 
should see Case & Schnare (1994) or Shan (2011). 
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specific ways. First, to our knowledge our study is the first to examine the asymmetric 
effect of house price shocks on the demand for reverse mortgages with respect to time 
lags. In this paper, we use loan level data on reverse mortgages originated from 1995 to 
2011. Our goal is to detect potential rent-seeking behaviors on the part of homeowners, 
taking advantage of the relative late downturned appraisal value of property to the 
actual market, and the “government as an always willing buyer” phenomenon.  
        Second, while prior studies have described the characteristics of reverse mortgage 
borrowers, we examine factors previously ignored. Davidoff (2004) argued that single 
women are the main users of reverse mortgages, citing that they often wish to take out 
the remaining equity out of homes more urgently than other households. Shan (2011) 
shows the significant changes in borrower characteristics, and find that single females, 
still with the largest proportion, constitute a declining fraction as of 2007. In this paper, 
we will further explain the trend of narrowing down the gap among three groups of 
borrowers in terms of the needs for cashing out their housing wealth, in particular 
during the recent boom-bust cycle of housing market. In addition to demographic 
factors, we take the county-specific labor market condition into account as well. Prior 
research investigate the influence of housing wealth on retirement behaviors (Sevak 
2002; Farnham and Sevak 2007; Disney, Ratcliffe, and Smith 2010.) Farnham and 
Sevak (2007) find that a 10% increase in housing wealth is associated with a reduction 
in expected retirement age of between 3.5 and 5 months. Also, Zhao and Burge (2015) 
find that older households adjust their current labor supply decisions to changes in 
housing wealth and financial wealth.  
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        The remaining portions of the paper are organized as follows. Section II describes 
the data we use for our analysis. Our methodology is outlined in Section III, while 
Section IV reports our empirical results. Section V concludes and lays out future 
directions. 
3.2 Data 
        The analysis mainly relies on the public HECM dataset that contains FHA loan-
level origination and performance data spanning the 17 years from 1995 to 2011. We 
exclude loans from 1989 to 1994 since reverse mortgages were so rarely used during 
this initial period. Further, some important variables, such as non-metropolitan housing 
price index and median household income, are not available over these early years. The 
dataset includes the number of originations, appraisal property value and location (at 
state, MSA and zip-code levels), payment plan, interest rate, lender information, and 
borrower information such as age, gender and marital status. Through a unique county 
level identifier, we merge the HECM data with local economic information, such as 
housing price index, unemployment rate and median household income. Our annual 
MSA level housing price indexes are taken from the FHFA. Annual county level 
unemployment rates are taken from the BLS. Finally, county-specific estimates of 
median household income come from the Census Bureau.  
        A few strategies are used during data processing and cleaning. The loan-level 
administrative HECM data provided by HUD includes a total of 949,171 raw mortgage 
records. Since our research explores the growth of reverse mortgage demand within 
counties, we aggregate loan level data to the county-year level, constructing the annual 
percentage change of originations made at county level as our main dependent variable. 
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We have 30,873 county-year observations. Second, we lose 6,393 observations since 
growth of originations made in some counties are not observed through all the years we 
analyze.  Eventually, our baseline sample has 21,981 county-year observations. (When 
we later we impose the requirement that a county has to originate at least 30 loans, our 
sample becomes 4080 county-year observations. The estimate results for this restricted 
sample are reported as a robustness check in the Section III.) The summary statistics are 
presented in Table 3.2. [Insert Table 3.2 about here]  
3.3 Estimations and Preliminary Results 
3.3.1 Factors Influencing the Demand for Reverse Mortgages 
    Modifying Shan (2011), the following model is adopted to examine the factors 
explaining growth of reverse mortgage originations: 
                               
                                                                             
         
  where originations_growth is the percentage change of MSA level housing price 
indexes. The variable of key interest is Housing price growth , the appreciation rate of 
home values. The coefficient    captures the effects of changes in housing prices on 
reverse mortgage demand, reflecting elderly homeowners‟ incentive to take advantage 
of booming home values to finance their retirement. ∆unemployment rate is the first 
differenced unemployment rate within counties.    reflects how the constraint of local 
employment condition would impact older homeowners‟ behaviors of tapping out their 
home equity since labor supply is an alternative that helps finance retirement.  median 
income is county-specific median household income.    captures the effect of being 
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wealthier or poorer in demanding the mortgages.      and    respectively represent 
county fixed effects and year fixed effects.  
   The estimated results are displayed in Table 3.3. [Insert Table 3.3 about here] Column 
(1) provides the results from the baseline model. The coefficient estimate for housing 
price growth is positive and significant, indicating counties with higher home value 
appreciation experienced great increases in reverse mortgage originations. The 
magnitude of 4.3 means that 1 percentage point increase in the regional housing price 
index is associated with a 4.3 percentage point increase in the originations of reverse 
mortgages. The estimated effect of changes in unemployment rate is found to be 
positive and significant, suggesting severe unemployment problems would also raise 
residents‟ demand for reverse mortgages. The estimated effect of local household 
income appears negative and significant. As expected, richer households are displaying 
the tendency to demand fewer reverse mortgages, perhaps due to more advanced 
retirement asset accumulation.  
    Column (2) displays the results with one year lagged housing price growth added. 
The specification considers the possible impact of lagged housing price appreciation. 
Results show a smaller effect of current housing price growth and a much larger effect 
of lagged housing price appreciation, although both are positive and significant. The 
coefficient for unemployment loses its significance in this estimation. Through columns 
(3) to (6), county fixed effects and year fixed effects are introduced sequentially and 
together. All the coefficient estimates for housing price growth and its one year lagged 
value are positive and significant, and the effects of other factors are not found to have 
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robust impact on demand of reverse mortgages. The standard errors increase 
substantially.  
3.3.2 Asymmetric Effect of Housing Price during the Recent Boom-Bust Cycle 
While the previous specifications follow the literature, the occurrence of gaps in time 
between housing prices and reverse mortgage demand is explored by allowing for 
asymmetric effects of housing prices during the upturns and downturns of the housing 
market. During the housing boom, elderly homeowners perceived the rising trend of the 
home values and seemed to have found it more beneficial to tap into their home equity. 
However, when the housing bust took hold in 2007, housing price movements may have 
asymmetric impacts on reverse mortgage growth. On the one hand, decreasing home 
values make homeowners hesitate to use reverse mortgages because their assets are 
worth less. On the other hand, because of the lagged nature of the property appraisal 
process, and the government as an “always willing buyer” phenomenon, homeowners 
believe their homes can be tapped out for more cash than the house is worth. This rent-
seeking incentive weakens, and may even overwhelm, the positive impact of housing 
prices, and slows down the pace of declining reverse mortgage market. To consider this 
potential asymmetric effect, we estimate the model as: 
                                 
                                                               
                                                        
    The specification expands to now include our key variable of interest, housing price 
growth*bust. This interaction term accounts for the potentially differential effects of 
housing price changes during the bust period. We define the status of bust at the county-
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specific level. Bust equals one only if the county experiences housing depreciation of 
over ten percent, and zero otherwise. The coefficient,    , captures the differential effect 
of housing price percentage change over the course of housing boom-bust cycle.    is 
expected to be negative and (  +  ) accounts for the effect of housing price movements 
on reverse mortgage demand over the housing bust.  
    Column (1) of Table 3.4 provides estimation results for the specification described in 
equation (2). [Insert Table 3.4 about here] The estimated coefficient for housing price 
growth is 4.48, and the effect remains positive and significant. The coefficient estimate 
of the interaction term between housing price and bust dummy is -1.31, negative and 
significant. This suggests when the county experiences ten percentage point of 
depreciation/appreciation during the recession, its originations of reverse mortgages 
decrease/increase by (4.48-1.31) percentage point. Column (2) adds 1-year lagged 
housing price growth to take lagged effect into account, and use the interaction term to 
further explore the asymmetric effect. The estimated differential effect remains 
negatively significant and reflects an asymmetric effect of housing price during the bust. 
The coefficient for housing price growth remains positive and significant, but it is of a 
much smaller magnitude. Column (3) displays the results when controlling for county 
fixed effect. The estimated effects of housing price and interaction term appear 
essentially similar. Column (4) includes the results with both county fixed effects and 
year fixed effects controlled for. The standard errors of all variables get bigger, and the 
coefficient estimate for the interaction term keep a negative sign but it turns 
insignificant due to a much smaller magnitude.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
In this article, we use loan level reverse mortgage data spanning both boom-bust 
cycle of housing market to construct analysis to better understand the development 
course of reverse mortgage market. We first examine the factors affecting growth of the 
reverse mortgage market, and then further identify potential asymmetric effect of 
housing price during the economic downturn. Due to the lagged property appraisal, 
homeowners may believe their homes can be tapped out for cash more than buyers 
actually assess. The rent-seeking incentive leads to a differential impact of housing 
prices and slows down the pace of declining reverse mortgage market. Our findings are 
consistent with our earlier expectations. They suggest housing price change function as 
the strongest and the most robust factor in explaining the expansion and shrinkage of 
the reverse mortgage market. Also, evidence is found to indicate asymmetric effect of 
housing price during the housing bust period in the expected direction.  
The presented results are only preliminary and the work is still in progress. My main 
plan to expand the analysis to investigate how type of borrower (e.g. married, single 
males and single females) influence this process and whether there is a gendered pattern 
related to expansion of the reverse mortgage market over the last two decades.  
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Table 3.1: Recent Major Changes in the HECM Program. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of Observations in the Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Maximum Loan Maximum Percent to Claim Range of Targeted Property Values
2006-2008 $ 417,000 62% $ 672,580
2009-2014 $ 625,000 56% $ 1,116,964
Variables Obs. Mean Std.
County HECM originations 21,981 35.16 145.17
County HECM originations (single females) 21,982 13.91 61.01
County HECM originations (single males) 21,983 5.97 27.41
County HECM originations (couples) 21,984 11.35 45.10
County HECM originations growth 21,985 47.50 128.05
County HECM originations growth (single females) 21,986 13.91 61.01
County HECM originations growth (single males) 21,987 5.97 27.41
County HECM originations growth (couples) 21,988 11.35 45.10
MSA housing price growth (%) 21,981 2.777 5.899
Bust period dummies 21,982 0.0171 0.1295
County unemployment rate change (%) 21,982 0.4333 1.4349
County median household income (in thousand dollars) 21,982 43.579 11.271
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Table 3.3: Effect of Housing Price on Reverse Mortgage Growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Asymmetric Effect of Housing Price on Reverse Mortgage Growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Housing price growth (%) 4.3335*** 1.2961*** 4.8937*** 2.9864*** 3.1534*** 2.2284***
(0.1562) (0.2572) (0.1765) (0.2147) (0.2360) (0.3462)
Housing price growth with 1 lag (%) 3.8703*** 1.2405***
(0.2611) (0.3398)
County unemployment rate change (%) 1.3307*** 0.5581 0.2391 1.0361 -0.3084 -0.6319
(0.6395) (0.6385) (0.6889) (1.0514) (1.1608) (1.1639)
County median household income -0.2797*** -0.3399*** 0.7573*** -0.3127 0.7088 0.4852
(in thousand $) (0.0755) (0.0752) (0.2264) (0.0752) (0.4114) (0.4158)
County FE N N Y N Y Y
Year FE N N N Y Y Y
Obs. 21,980 21,980 21,980 21,980 21,980 21,980
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Housing price growth (%) 4.4792*** 1.4419*** 5.1539*** 2.2315***
(0.1657) (0.2630) (0.1904) (0.3610)
Housing price growth* Bust -1.3094*** -1.3109*** -2.1284*** -0.0187
(0.4972) (0.4948) (0.5844) (0.6101)
Housing price growth with 1 lag (%) 3.8704*** 1.2415***
(0.2611) (0.3414)
County unemployment rate change (%) 1.2617** 0.4889 0.1078 -0.6349
(0.6399) (0.6389) (0.6897) (1.1680)
County median household income (in thousand dollars) -0.2880*** -0.3485*** 0.7518 0.4850
(0.0755) (0.0753) (0.2266) (0.4159)
County FE N N Y Y
Year FE N N N Y
Obs. 21,980 21,980 21,980 21,980
*Significance at the 10% level. **Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level.
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Figure 3.1: HECM Originations and National Housing Prices, 1995-2011. 
 
Source: National Case-Shiller home price indexes and originations of HECM loans   from HUD. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Originations of Reverse Mortgages vs. Home Values, 2004-2011. 
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Figure 3.3: Types of Borrowers 
 
Source: HUD. 
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